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ARTICLES 
CLIMATE CHANGE TRIAGE 
BY 
NOAH M. SACHS* 
Climate change is the first global triage crisis. It is caused by the 
overuse of a severely limited natural resource—the atmosphere’s 
capacity to absorb greenhouse gases—and millions of lives depend on 
how international law allocates this resource among nations. 
This Article is the first to explore solutions for climate change 
mitigation through the lens of triage ethics, drawing on law, 
philosophy, moral theory, and economics. The literature on triage 
ethics—developed in contexts such as battlefield trauma, organ 
donation, emergency medicine, and distribution of food and shelter—
has direct implications for climate change policy and law, yet it has 
been overlooked by climate change scholars. The triage lens rules out 
climate policies—including the current emissions path—that will lead 
to catastrophic warming, and it puts options on the table that are 
marginalized in the current United Nations negotiations on a climate 
change agreement. 
This Article examines three allocation principles that could 
potentially apply in climate change triage—utilitarianism, 
egalitarianism, and a market-based distribution—and it concludes that 
 
* Professor, University of Richmond School of Law and Director, Robert R. Merhige, Jr. Center 
for Environmental Studies. The ideas presented in this Article owe a great debt to my early 
mentor Edward N. Beiser of Brown University and to scholars who have written extensively on 
issues of climate change justice, such as Dan Farber, Stephen Gardiner, James Garvey, and Dale 
Jamieson. Dan Farber, Amy Sinden, Jonathan Wight, and Kevin Walsh provided helpful 
comments on drafts, and Ryan Murphy and Viktoriia Chekhivska provided invaluable research 
assistance. Thanks to all the participants at the conference, Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on 
Climate Ethics, held in Como, Italy, where this Article was presented in September 2013, and 
especially Stephen Gardiner, John Nolt, Peter Ditto, and the conference organizers, Marco 
Grasso and Ezra Markowitz. 
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egalitarianism is the preferable allocation principle from the standpoint 
of ethics and international law. This Article ends by exploring four 
major policy implications that emerge from viewing climate change 
through the lens of triage. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the earth warms this century, governments will confront tragic 
choices, and new frameworks of law and ethics will be needed to govern our 
relationship to the natural world and to each other. Global climate change 
will cause severe food and water scarcity, resource conflict, and sea-level 
rise that will threaten major cities.1 Many nations will become overwhelmed 
 
 1  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME 
EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 15–16 (Christopher B. Field et 
al. eds., 2012); Anthony Oliver-Smith, Climate Change and Population Displacement: Disasters 
and Diasporas in the Twenty-First Century, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: FROM 
ENCOUNTERS TO ACTIONS 116, 132 (Susan A. Crate & Mark Nuttall eds., 2009); François Gemenne, 
Climate-Induced Population Displacements in a 4°C+ World, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL 
SOC’Y A 182, 182–85 (2011), available at http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content 
/369/1934/182.full. See also OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES 
(UNHCR), FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGES FOR STATES 
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by these impacts, and some nations will likely be destroyed. Already, Pacific 
island nations are evacuating their citizens as they lose their territory to the 
rising seas.2 Warming at the high range of estimates for this century, five to 
six degrees Celsius (9 to 10.8 degrees Fahrenheit), would be civilization-
altering.3 It would constitute more than a 35% increase in the average surface 
temperature of the planet since the middle of the twentieth century.4 
These massive ecological changes will likely give rise to new legal 
regimes and ethical values that we can scarcely envision. Older, twentieth 
century frameworks for human interaction with nature, such as Garret 
Hardin’s tragedy of the commons5 or Aldo Leopold’s land ethic,6 provide 
little guidance for the hard choices on resource allocation and survival that 
we face in a warming world. 
Triage provides a new, twenty-first century framework. Triage comes 
from the French trier, which means to pick or cull.7 It refers to allocation of 
 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 3–4 (2009), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009 
/smsn/igo/049.pdf (citing rising sea levels, threats to livelihood, and environmental degradation 
as reasons for population displacement). 
 2  See Paul Chapman, Entire Nation of Kiribati to be Relocated Due to Sea Level Threat, 
THE TELEGRAPH, Mar. 7, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepac 
ific/kiribati/9127576/Entire-nation-of-Kiribati-to-be-relocated-over-rising-sea-level-threat.html 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (discussing relocation of the population of Kiribati to Fiji); Jo 
Confino, Climate Change May Force Evacuation of Vulnerable Island States Within a Decade, 
THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 4, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/sustainable-business/blog/polar-arctic-
greenland-ice-climate-change?newsfeed=true (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (noting that Pacific 
island nations like Tuvalu will contend with evacuation decisions within a decade); see also 
UNHCR, CLIMATE CHANGE AND STATELESSNESS: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a2d189d3.pdf (“Low-lying island States are thus very likely to be 
entirely uninhabitable long before their full submersion, causing entire populations and the 
governments to be externally displaced.”).  
 3  INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, REDRAWING THE ENERGY-CLIMATE MAP: WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 
SPECIAL REPORT 9 (2013), available at http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publicat 
ion/WEO_Special_Report_2013_Redrawing_the_Energy_Climate_Map.pdf; POTSDAM INST. FOR 
CLIMATE IMPACT RESEARCH AND CLIMATE ANALYTICS, TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CLIMATE EXTREMES, 
REGIONAL IMPACTS, AND THE CASE FOR RESILIENCE xv, xvii (2013), available at http://www. 
worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Full_Report_Vol_2_Turn_Down_The_Heat_
%20Climate_Extremes_Regional_Impacts_Case_for_Resilience_Print%20version_FINAL.pdf; 
see also MET OFFICE HADLEY CENTRE ET AL., ADVANCE: IMPROVED SCIENCE FOR MITIGATION POLICY 
ADVICE 7–8 (Vicky Pope et al. eds., 2010), available at http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/ 
media/pdf/n/c/advance.pdf (discussing the effect on ecosystems and agriculture resulting from 
future temperature changes, the high end of which is five to six degrees Celsius); Richard A. 
Betts et al., When Could Global Warming Reach 4°C?, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 67, 
78–82 (2011) (discussing numerous studies indicating five to six degrees Celsius as the high end 
of temperature increase by the end of the century).  
 4  Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin., NASA Finds Sustained 2013 Long-Term Climate 
Warming Trend, http://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/news/20140121/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) 
(noting that the average surface temperature of the earth was 14.6 degrees Celsius in 2013, 
about 0.6 degrees higher than the mid-twentieth century baseline). 
 5  See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).  
 6  See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 224–25 
(1949) (“A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”). 
 7  2 HARRAP’S NEW STANDARD FRENCH AND ENGLISH DICTIONARY T:51 (1972). 
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scarce resources under life-and-death conditions—disaster, war, medical 
emergency, or calamity—where the needs of all claimants exceed the 
available resource supply.8 
The literature on triage ethics, which has emerged from disparate fields 
such as military medicine, organ donation, and disaster response, is directly 
relevant to the allocation dilemmas of climate change. Indeed, the triage 
ethics literature addresses one of the central questions of the climate change 
era: How can just policy solutions be implemented in situations of immense 
scarcity? No scholar, however, has engaged with this triage ethics literature 
for insights into climate change policy.9 
This Article is the first to explore solutions for climate change 
mitigation through the lens of triage ethics, bringing together perspectives 
from law, philosophy, moral theory, and economics. The politics of climate 
change have been thoroughly dominated by economic considerations,10 
especially in the United States, and the triage framework I develop here 
helps to widen the discourse: It squarely highlights the need for moral 
accountability and allocative fairness. Climate negotiators from over 190 
countries are slated to meet in Paris in 2015 to finalize a new global climate 
change agreement,11 and new perspectives on the core allocation dilemmas 
of the treaty are urgently needed. 
To slow the rate of warming, policy makers need to triage a scarce 
resource, the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb greenhouse gases. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has estimated that the 
atmosphere can absorb no more than 3,670 billion tons of carbon dioxide 
since the middle of the nineteenth century if warming is to remain within 
 
 8  RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1392 (1999). 
 9  There is growing scholarly interest in equity and justice issues in climate change policy, 
but none of these works have drawn on the triage ethics literature. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. 
GARDINER, A PERFECT MORAL STORM: THE ETHICAL TRAGEDY OF CLIMATE CHANGE 420–21 (2011); 
JAMES GARVEY, THE ETHICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: RIGHT AND WRONG IN A WARMING WORLD 68–69 
(2008); Jonathan C. Carlson, Reflections on a Problem of Climate Justice: Climate Change and 
the Rights of States in a Minimalist International Legal Order, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 45, 45 (2009); Daniel A. Farber, The Case for Climate Compensation: Justice for Climate 
Change Victims in a Complex World, 2008 UTAH L. REV 377, 377 (2008).  
 10  See 159 CONG. REC. S926-27 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2013) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse); 155 
CONG. REC. H6542 (daily ed. June 11, 2009) (statement of Cong. Tsongas); INTERAGENCY 
WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, at 2 (2013); DAVID W. KREUTZER 
ET AL., HERITAGE FOUNDATION, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 3978, COST OF A CLIMATE POLICY: THE ECONOMIC 
IMPACT OF OBAMA’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 1 (2013), available at http://www.heritage.org/res 
earch/reports/2013/06/climate-policy-economic-impact-and-cost-of-obama-s-climate-action-plan; 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, LIMITING THE MAGNITUDE OF FUTURE CLIMATE CHANGE 6–7 (2010); 
WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE OPTIONS ON GLOBAL WARMING 
POLICIES 17–19 (2008); WILLIAM NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC 
MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING 4 (2000) (describing development of integrated-assessment 
economic models for global warming). 
 11  Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The Climate Change Regime—Between a Rock and a 
Hard Place?, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 625, 633 (2014); Editorial, Running Out of Time, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/opinion/running-out-of-time.html (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
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two degrees Celsius,12 the warming limit identified by most climate scientists 
as reasonably safe.13 Because we have emitted about 1,890 billion tons since 
that time, we have already used half of the available carbon budget, and 
emissions are rising fast.14 Many analysts have concluded that humanity will 
exhaust the remaining carbon budget within three decades if the current 
intensive path of greenhouse gas emissions continues.15 Indeed, in a finding 
that clearly demonstrates the triage situation we face, the IPCC recently 
concluded that global greenhouse gas emissions must reach “near zero” by 
2100 to keep warming below two degrees Celsius.16 
Governments now face a two-fold challenge as they debate a new 
climate change agreement: first, they need to preserve this scarce 
atmospheric resource as long as possible by limiting global emissions; and 
second, they need to allocate this scarce atmospheric space fairly among 
themselves. 
Seen in this light, the climate crisis is the first global-scale triage crisis, 
yet we are failing to recognize it in these terms.17 If policy makers were to 
 
 12  See IPCC, FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, SUMMARY FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 27–28 (Stocker et al. eds., 2013), available at http://www.climatechange 
2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf. The IPCC concluded that an emissions 
budget of 3,670 billion tons of carbon dioxide would provide more than a 66% chance of keeping 
warming within the two degree limit. Id.  
 13  See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CHANGE, CLIMATE PROTECTION STRATEGIES FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY: KYOTO AND BEYOND 1–2 (2003), available at http://eesc.columbia.edu 
/courses/v1003/readings/Dangerous.climate.change.2003.pdf (defining “acceptable” warming as 
two degrees Celsius); Malte Meinshausen et al., Greenhouse-Gas Emission Targets for Limiting 
Global Warming to 2ºC, 458 NATURE 1158, 1159 (2009); see also M.G.J. DEN ELZEN & M. 
MEINSHAUSEN, MEETING THE EU 2ºC CLIMATE TARGET: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL EMISSION 
IMPLICATIONS 6 (2005), available at http://www.pbl.nl/sites/default/files/cms/publicaties/728 
001031.pdf (noting that even the two degree threshold cannot be regarded as a “harm-free”); 
Rachel Warren, Impacts of Global Climate Change at Different Annual Mean Global 
Temperature Increases, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 93, 93–94 (Hans Joachim 
Schellnhuber et al. eds., 2006) (summarizing climate change impacts at a range of different 
levels of warming).  
 14  IPCC, supra note 12, at 27–28.  
 15  See Kelly Levin, World’s Carbon Budget to Be Spent in Three Decades, WORLD 
RESOURCES INST., Sept. 27, 2013, http://www.wri.org/blog/2013/09/world%E2%80%99s-carbon-
budget-be-spent-three-decades (last visited Nov. 22, 2014); Gayathri Vaidyanathan, World May 
Blow Through Global Warming Pollution Limit in Thirty Years, SCIENTIFIC AM., Sept. 22, 2014, 
available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/world-may-blow-through-global-warming 
-pollution-limit-in-30-years/; see also Meinshausen et al., supra note 13, at 1158 (estimating that a 
1,000 billion ton carbon budget between 2000 and 2049 would provide a 75% chance of keeping 
warming within the two degree goal). 
 16  IPCC, FIFTH ASSESSMENT SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 21 (2014), 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr1.pdf. 
 17  Some policy makers have explicitly stated that they will not confront the hard choices 
posed by a limited carbon budget. In 2013, for example, Christiana Figueres, Executive 
Secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), stated that a 
carbon emissions budget could not be the basis for UN negotiations because a carbon budget is 
a “zero sum game” and “politically it would be very difficult” to negotiate based on the budget. 
Fiona Harvey, IPCC’s ‘Carbon Budget’ Will Not Drive Warsaw Talks, Says Christiana Figueres, 
THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/oct/24/ipcc-
carbon-budget-warsaw-climate-change-christiana-figueres (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
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follow triage principles, they would be forced to confront hard questions: Is 
there a sustainable use of the limited atmospheric resource? If so, who 
should have access to it? And what formula or principle should guide the 
allocation? 
The triage framework outlined in this Article addresses these questions 
and takes seriously the finite carbon emissions budget. This framework 
offers normative guidance for climate treaty negotiators from the United 
States and other countries and rules out policies, including the current path 
of global emissions, that would tolerate warming far beyond two degrees 
Celsius. It also puts options on the table, such as per capita distribution of 
emissions rights, that are currently marginalized in the United Nations 
talks.18 The triage lens generates a climate change discourse focused on 
ecological preservation and public health. It forces us to think socially rather 
than individually. It therefore serves as an important framework for 
advancing justice during the “long emergency” of climate change.19 
In surveying the triage ethics literature, I identify three principles that 
could potentially serve as a basis for allocating scarce atmospheric space: 
utilitarian principles, traditionally applied in contexts such as battlefield and 
emergency medicine; egalitarian principles, traditionally applied in contexts 
such as distribution of emergency food and shelter; and a market-based 
distribution, the most common way that societies allocate scarce goods in 
non-emergency situations.20 
In allocating scarce emissions rights through an international treaty, I 
argue, the dominant principle of justice should be egalitarianism. Every 
person on earth is a legitimate claimant on the atmosphere’s capacity to 
absorb emissions, regardless of race, geography, wealth, or nationality. In 
allocating a vital natural resource like the atmosphere—owned by no one 
and held in common—an equal per capita distribution should be the starting 
point for discussion. 
The other two alternatives have serious drawbacks as principles to 
guide climate change law. A market-based distribution of emissions rights, 
based on ability to pay, would cripple the development of poor nations and 
privilege the wealthiest nations, which have become wealthy in large part by 
burning fossil fuels—the largest source of greenhouse gases. Utilitarian 
approaches to the allocation dilemma are problematic because there is no 
globally agreed upon conception of the good we are trying to promote in 
allocating scarce atmospheric space. Contenders might include gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth, per capita GDP growth, other indicators of 
 
 18  ASIM ZIA, POST-KYOTO CLIMATE GOVERNANCE: CONFRONTING THE POLITICS OF SCALE, 
IDEOLOGY AND KNOWLEDGE 132 (2013) (noting that per capita distributions of emissions rights 
are “not acceptable” to developed countries); Andrew Light, An Equity Hurdle in International 
Climate Negotiations, PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y Q., Spring 2013, at 28, 33. 
 19  See generally JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE LONG EMERGENCY: SURVIVING THE END OF 
OIL, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND OTHER CONVERGING CATASTROPHES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
(2005).  
 20  See infra text accompanying notes 109–131. 
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human development, environmental preservation, religious commitment, or 
even a vague goal such as human happiness.21 
My support for egalitarian allocation principles challenges the work of 
scholars such as Cass Sunstein, Eric Posner, and David Weisbach, who have 
argued that a just solution for climate change can be derived from welfarist 
principles aimed at maximizing net monetized return for negotiating 
parties.22 Their perspective is unduly narrow and ignores important issues of 
equity. Their welfarist approach, grounded in utilitarianism, suggests that 
some nations or populations are more deserving than others of atmospheric 
space, yet attempts to engage in a sorting of the deserving would eviscerate 
international support for a climate change treaty. 
While analyzing the merits and drawbacks of these three approaches to 
climate change triage, I also show that current climate change policies 
reflect none of these approaches. We are instead engaging in a global free-
for-all of greenhouse gas emissions, proceeding along no principled path. 
Collectively, we are engaging in a chaotic run on the available supply of the 
atmosphere’s capacity to absorb emissions.23 
There are many differences, of course, between traditional triage 
contexts and the “super wicked problem” of climate change.24 Atmospheric 
space is not, strictly speaking, a life-saving resource. Rather, it is the misuse 
or failure to conserve this resource that threatens human life. Moreover, 
because there are no duly empowered global triage personnel, no allocation 
system for climate change mitigation can be imposed by fiat, unlike in 
emergency room or battlefield triage contexts.25 
These are important limitations on the use of triage ethics in climate 
change law, and they are discussed further in this Article. The point of this 
Article, however, is not to suggest that triage ethics can dictate all the 
innumerable details of a climate change treaty, but rather it is to offer a 
framework for considering the resource allocation decisions we face. By 
examining the ethical principles that have historically governed triage, I aim 
 
 21  See BEDRICH MOLDAN ET AL., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., COMPOSITE INDICATORS 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY (2004) (discussing GDP as a measure of development 
progress in comparison to other, broader indicators of development progress such as health 
outcomes and literacy).  
 22  See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565, 1572 
(2008); ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 6 (2010). Posner and 
Weisbach note that countries will not join a climate change treaty unless they believe the treaty 
makes them better off, a concept they call International Paretianism. Id. In their view, “all states 
must believe themselves better off by their lights as a result of the climate [change] treaty.” Id. 
While their use of the term “by their lights” seems to encompass many different conceptions of 
the good, Posner and Weisbach focus most of their argument on monetary definitions of the 
good, which countries would optimize through cost–benefit analysis. See id. at 11–13; see also 
Dale Jamieson, Climate Change, Consequentialism, and the Road Ahead, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 439, 
454–58 (2013) (discussing Posner and Weisbach’s definitions of welfarism and International 
Paretianism).  
 23  POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 22, at 29–33. 
 24  See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the 
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1160 (2009). 
 25  See id. at 1160–61. 
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to highlight alternatives to the laissez-faire status quo, illustrating how we 
can use scarce atmospheric resources effectively—and justly—in the 
coming decades. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II overviews the scarcity and 
allocation dilemmas presented by climate change, drawing the connections 
between climate change and traditional triage contexts. Part III examines 
the literature on triage ethics, outlining some of the core principles that have 
emerged from battlefield medicine, emergency medicine, disaster response, 
organ donation, and other contexts. This Part highlights three potential 
allocation principles for scarce goods and shows how policy makers and 
disaster responders have struggled to maintain ethical standards in the midst 
of grave emergencies. Finally, Part IV outlines four major policy implications 
of using a triage framework to address the climate change crisis and 
explores how triage ethics can help shape the international law of climate 
change. 
II. A TRIAGE FRAMEWORK FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
The demanding task of allocating the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb 
greenhouse gas emissions is undoubtedly a triage challenge. According to 
the IPCC, greenhouse gas emissions must be brought down significantly by 
2050, 80%–90% in the developed world, to avert the worst consequences of 
warming,26 and then reach “near zero” by 2100.27 An effective climate change 
treaty must somehow enforce, or incentivize, that dramatic reduction in oil, 
coal, and gas consumption, and nations must somehow allocate the difficult 
burdens among themselves. 
To see how triage choices are immanent within the problem of climate 
change mitigation, it is important to define precisely the resource in short 
supply. What, exactly, is being allocated in negotiations for a new climate 
change treaty? What are the limits on the resource? And what are the 
options for allocation? 
A. The Atmosphere As a Scarce Natural Resource 
The scarce resource being allocated in the current climate change 
negotiations is the capacity of the atmosphere to absorb carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases. The IPCC has calculated that there are about 1,780 
billion tons left in the carbon budget if we are to limit warming to two 
degrees Celsius.28 The average surface temperature of the earth in the mid-
twentieth century was about fourteen degrees Celsius,29 so even a two 
degree increase is sizeable. 
 
 26  See IPCC, CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE 107 (2014), available at http://www. 
ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srccs/srccs_wholereport.pdf. 
 27  IPCC, supra note 16. 
 28  See IPCC, supra note 12. 
 29  See Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin, NASA Finds Sustained Long-Term Climate 
Warming Trend, http://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/news/20140121/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
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Climate scientists have understood for decades that there is some 
maximum amount of greenhouse gases that can be added to the atmosphere 
before warming becomes catastrophic, and the effort to place precise 
numbers on the carbon budget has intensified in the past five years.30 
Approximately 0.8 degrees of warming has occurred since preindustrial 
times31 with devastating consequences,32 and continued warming is “locked 
in” from emissions of the past few decades.33 Consequently, an emissions 
budget that keeps warming under two degrees is exceedingly small relative 
to the desires of almost all nations to develop fossil-fuel intensive 
economies. The urgent challenge for international law, therefore, is to 
establish a system of allocations and incentives that preserves the scarce 
resource and avoids the humanitarian catastrophe that lies beyond two 
degrees of warming.34 
Although some scholars have questioned the necessity of a two degree 
threshold,35 all parties to the United Nations (UN) climate negotiations have 
pledged to cooperate to stay within the two degree limit,36 and that goal has 
been reiterated in numerous fora, including the G8 and G20.37 In committing 
 
 30  See IPCC, supra note 12; P. Friedlingstein et al., Persistent Growth in CO2 Emissions and 
Implications for Reaching Climate Targets, 7 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 709–15 (2014); Meinshausen 
et al., supra note 13, at 1158.  
 31  COMM. ON AMERICA’S CLIMATE CHOICES, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, AMERICA’S CLIMATE 
CHOICES 15 (2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12781&page=15 
(“The average temperature of the Earth’s surface increased by about 1.4°F (0.8°C) over the past 
100 years . . . .”). 
 32  Id. at 18. 
 33  Id. at 25. 
 34  See generally IPCC, supra note 12, at 4 (analyzing the observed and potential impacts of 
climate change); COMM. ON THE DEV. OF AN INTEGRATED SCI. STRATEGY FOR OCEAN ACIDIFICATION 
MONITORING, RESEARCH, AND IMPACTS ASSESSMENT, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OCEAN 
ACIDIFICATION: A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF A CHANGING OCEAN 16 (2010), 
available at http://www.nap.edu/download.php?record_id=12904 (noting the contribution of 
global warming to ocean acidification and noting that even under “optimistic scenarios,” the 
mean ocean surface pH will likely drop below 7.9 by the end of the century, impacting 
ecosystems and ecosystem services); Kerry A. Emanuel, Downscaling CMIP5 Climate Models 
Shows Increased Tropical Cyclone Activity Over the 21st Century, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
U.S. 12,219, 12,221 (2013), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/110/30/12219.full.pdf+html 
(projecting increased global tropical cyclone activity based on historical conditions and 
projected emissions).  
 35  See Richard S. J. Tol, Europe’s Long-Term Climate Target: A Critical Evaluation, 35 
ENERGY POL’Y 424, 429 (2007), available at http://www.mi.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/fnu-
files/publication/tol/RM7208.pdf (arguing that the justifications for the two degree target are 
“inadequate”).  
 36  See UNFCCC, Dec. 7–19, 2009, Copenhagen Accord, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord], available at http://unf 
ccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf (noting that the pledge is in recognition of “the 
scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below two degrees 
Celsius . . . .”); UNFCCC, Cancun Agreements, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the 
Parties, ¶ 4, U.N. DOC. UNFCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (reiterating the goal to “hold the increase in 
global average temperature to below 2 C above pre-industrial levels”). 
 37  Conference of the Group of Eight, May 18–19, 2012, Camp David Declaration, ¶ 13 
(2012), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/191848.pdf (affirming 
commitment to address climate change with a goal of keeping warming under two degrees); see 
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to that goal, nations have, in essence, created and defined the scarcity in the 
atmosphere. They have defined the carbon budget. The scarcity is not 
absolute. Nations could collectively exceed the two degree limit and 
postpone, for a while, many of the hard choices of allocation. However, 
exceeding two degrees of warming would have disastrous consequences for 
human welfare and global ecosystems.38 With a two degree goal, the window 
to maintain the climatic stability of the earth is rapidly closing, and we are 
headed toward overshoot. 
Under a high-emissions pathway for the rest of this century—a 
plausible scenario given current trends—humanity will pass the two degree 
red line and reach catastrophic five to six degrees Celsius warming by 2100, 
with additional warming after 2100.39 Five degrees of warming represents 
more than a 35% increase in the average surface temperature of the earth 
since the mid-twentieth century.40 Under this high-emissions pathway, sea 
levels would rise more than a meter.41 Low-lying areas such as South Florida, 
Eastern Virginia, and the National Mall in Washington, D.C. will be severely 
impacted by rising sea levels.42 Africa and Asia could lose one-third of their 
food supply.43 Some climate scientists view warming of that magnitude as 
“beyond adaptation.”44 
The scarcity in the carbon budget is dire, and staying within the two 
degree limit will entail wrenching choices and significant changes in how we 
use energy and land. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has concluded, 
for example, that if humanity is to remain within the two degree limit, no 
more than one-third of proven reserves of fossil fuels can be consumed prior 
 
Conference of the Group of Twenty, June 18–19, 2012, Los Cabos Declaration, ¶¶ 70–71 (2012), 
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131069.pdf 
(affirming commitment to the full implementation of the outcome of the Cancun and Durban 
agreements). 
 38  Farber, supra note 9, at 382–83. 
 39  See POTSDAM INST. FOR CLIMATE IMPACT RESEARCH AND CLIMATE ANALYTICS, supra note 3, 
at xv; see also INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011, at 210 (2011) [hereinafter 
ENERGY OUTLOOK], available at http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/we 
o2011_web.pdf. 
 40  Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin., supra note 4. 
 41  See Robert J. Nicholls et al., Sea-level Rise and Its Possible Impacts Given a ‘Beyond 4°C 
World’ in the Twenty-First Century, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 161, 174 (2010), 
available at http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1934/161.abstract; W.T. Pfeffer et 
al., Kinematic Constraints on Glacier Contributions to 21st-Century Sea-Level Rise, 321 SCI. 
1340, 1342 (2008); Stefan Rahmstorf, A Semi-Empirical Approach to Projecting Future Sea-Level 
Rise, 315 SCI. 368, 370 fig.4 (2007). 
 42  See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, fig. 17.6 (Jerry M. Melillo et al. eds., 2014), available at http://ncadac.globalchange.gov 
/download/NCAJan11-2013-publicreviewdraft-chap17-southeast.pdf. 
 43  CATRIONA MCKINNON, CLIMATE CHANGE AND FUTURE JUSTICE: PRECAUTION, COMPENSATION, 
AND TRIAGE 108 (2012).  
 44  For example, Kevin Anderson, former Director of The Tyndall Center, the U.K.’s leading 
climate research institution, warned that “a 4 degrees C future is incompatible with an 
organized global community, is likely to be beyond ‘adaptation,’ is devastating to the majority of 
ecosystems, and has a high probability of not being stable.” BENJAMIN K. SAVACOOL & MICHAEL H. 
DWORKIN, GLOBAL ENERGY JUSTICE 74 (2014). 
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to 2050.45 In other words, two-thirds of proven reserves of oil, coal, and 
natural gas, including reserves that firms have paid billions of dollars to 
acquire, must be left in the ground to stay within the global carbon budget.46  
Neither international law nor domestic law has ever mandated the 
stranding of assets of that magnitude. This is clearly new legal and ethical 
terrain. 
Some climatologists contend that the two degree goal is too lax, and 
nations should aim to limit warming to an even lower number. James 
Hansen, former head of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, has 
argued that 350 parts per million (ppm) is the acceptable safe concentration 
of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, which corresponds to roughly 1.5 
degrees of warming over preindustrial temperatures.47 The current 
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is more than 400 ppm.48 
Under Hansen’s view, therefore, we have already overshot the emissions 
budget. We are not in a situation of scarcity, where there is a limited 
resource to allocate. Rather, we are facing a painful adjustment to a time 
when the atmosphere has no absorptive capacity left. 
Assuming a two degree warming limit, it is clear that the health and 
welfare of billions of people—living now and in the future—will depend on: 
1) whether nations in fact behave in a way that conserves the remaining 
atmospheric resource to stay within the two degree limit, or close to it; and 
2) the distributional question of how to allocate the remaining atmospheric 
resource among nations. 
When the labyrinthine UN climate change treaty negotiations are 
distilled to these two core issues, a climate change treaty can be understood 
as a triage protocol. A climate change treaty is, in essence, a blueprint for 
allocating a scarce resource among claimants, under life and death 
conditions. 
To be sure, the UN treaty negotiations include innumerable sub-issues, 
such as financing mechanisms, monitoring and verification, emissions 
trading, differential timetables and commitments for developed and 
developing states, and the legal architecture of the treaty.49 The sprawling 
number of issues is a major reason why negotiations have been so 
protracted. But the core decision is allocative—the parceling out of a limited 
natural resource. 
 
 45  ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 39, at 241. 
 46  See id. 
 47  See James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 OPEN 
ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 229 (2008).  
 48  Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Carbon Dioxide at NOAA’s Mauna Loa Observatory 
Reaches New Milestone: Tops 400 ppm, http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/news/2013/CO2400.html (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
 49  See, e.g., US CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK, DOHA CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS BRIEFING BOOK 
(2012), available at http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/resource-database/doha-climate-negotia 
tions-briefing-book; see generally DANIEL BODANSKY, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE EFFORTS BEYOND 
2012: A SURVEY OF APPROACHES (2004), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads 
/2012%20new.pdf (prepared for the Pew Center on Global Climate Change). 
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It might be argued that the picture of scarcity described here is too 
static because it ignores human ingenuity and our capacity to develop 
solutions. Some might argue that major technological or societal changes, 
such as a design revolution in buildings or transportation or potential 
breakthrough energy technologies, will avert the hard triage choices. If there 
is an unprecedented innovation around the corner, it would be a welcome 
development, but it would not fundamentally alter the scarcity or the 
allocation dilemmas outlined here. 
Time is running very short to avoid catastrophic warming. If global 
greenhouse gas emissions continue their rise beyond 2020, it will be nearly 
impossible to keep warming below two degrees Celsius even if nations begin 
wider deployment of low-carbon energy sources after 2020.50 If breakthrough 
technologies in efficiency and low-carbon energy were developed, they 
might not be able to keep pace with the growing global population and the 
vast consumer society taking root in the developing world. With new 
technologies, it might be possible to achieve lower emissions per person, but 
we will have more people, with higher lifestyle expectations.51 In the near 
term, we will likely face what Thomas Homer-Dixon has called an “ingenuity 
gap,”52 in which the scale of the problem exceeds our capacity to adjust. 
B. Allocating the Scarce Atmospheric Resource 
Scarcity alone does not result in a triage situation. Radio spectrum is a 
scarce resource that governments traditionally allocate through auctions 
and licenses.53 Oceanfront real estate is a scarce resource that is allocated 
through the market. Though these resources are scarce, we do not typically 
consider these allocation decisions to present what Guido Calabresi and 
Phillip Bobbitt have called “tragic choices.” Tragic choices are situations 
where “scarcities . . . make particularly painful choices necessary” and 
where allocations “arouse emotions of compassion, outrage, and terror.”54 
The allocation choices in climate change mitigation are tragic choices. 
The choices are pregnant with justice concerns because the past 
consumption of fossil fuel has been so unequal among nations; increases in 
emissions anywhere in the world cause harm elsewhere; and any limitation 
on emissions rights could affect the development and aspirations of 
nations.55 Climate change allocation is a moral choice, not just an economic 
 
 50  See, e.g., Kevin Anderson & Alice Bows, Beyond ‘Dangerous’ Climate Change: Emission 
Scenarios for a New World, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 20, 20 (2011). 
 51  The United Nations predicts that global population will rise from the current 7.1 billion 
to 9.6 billion by 2050. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 
2012 REVISION, VOLUME I: COMPREHENSIVE TABLES 1 (2013), available at http://esa.un.org/wpp 
/Documentation/pdf/WPP2012_Volume-I_Comprehensive-Tables.pdf. 
 52  THOMAS HOMER-DIXON, THE INGENUITY GAP 1 (2000). 
 53  See 47 C.F.R. § 2.100–.104 (2014) (addressing allocation, assignment, and use of radio 
frequencies).  
 54  GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILLIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 17–18 (1978). 
 55  Albert Mumma & David Hodas, Designing a Global Post-Kyoto Climate Change Protocol 
that Advances Human Development, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 619, 624–26 (2008). 
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one. Indeed, the philosopher Stephen Gardiner has referred to climate 
change as a “perfect moral storm” that challenges both traditional 
approaches to policy making and traditional theories of justice.56 
To understand the tragic choices in allocating atmospheric space, it is 
helpful to examine both the intragenerational and the intergenerational 
features of climate change triage. These two contexts are considered below. 
1. Intragenerational Climate Change Triage 
The allocation discussion that has received the most attention in the UN 
climate talks is intragenerational—allocating emissions rights among 
nations—subject to the ability of nations to trade these emissions rights 
once allocated.57 In this intragenerational context, the parallels to traditional 
triage practice rest on four main foundations. 
First, the allocation of atmospheric space is zero-sum, just as in 
allocation of physician time in an emergency room or medicine on a 
battlefield. All nations are dipping into the same common pool resource, and 
access by one nation is rival to others. If China continues to increase its 
greenhouse gas emissions by 10% per year, as it has recently,58 substantially 
less of the limited atmospheric resource will be available for other nations if 
the two degree limit is to be maintained. United States emissions have been 
declining overall since 2007, but even declining use of the carbon budget still 
uses the budget, leaving less for other nations.59 In a climate change treaty 
that respects the physical limits of the atmosphere, a lax emissions 
reduction target for one nation means a stricter target for another. 
Second, life and death are at stake. Millions of individuals living in low-
lying coastal areas are at risk from sea-level rise, flooding, and more intense 
storms, and subsistence farmers across the globe are at risk of starvation 
from more frequent droughts.60 Water-scarce cities such as Phoenix will 
 
 56  GARDINER, supra note 9, at 8. This perfect moral storm, Gardiner argues, “puts pressure 
on the very terms in which we discuss the environmental crisis, tempting us to distort our moral 
sensibilities in order to facilitate the exploitation of our global and intergenerational position.” 
Id. 
 57  Mumma & Hodas, supra note 55, at 639–40. 
 58  See Jonathan Kaiman, China’s Emissions Expected to Rise Until 2030, Despite Ambitious 
Green Policies, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 26, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012 
/nov/26/china-emissions-rise-green-policies (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
 59  See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-R-13-001, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2011, at ES-5–7, Tbl.ES-2 (2013). While there were years of decline in 
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions after 2007, between 2012 and 2013 U.S. emissions increased 
2.5%. See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION AGENCY, U.S. Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 
2013 at 1 (2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/carbon/pdf/2013_co2 
analysis.pdf. 
 60  Conference of the Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Mar. 5–7, 2008, 
Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation in the Food and Agriculture Sector, 1, U.N. Doc. 
HLC/08BAK/1 (June 2008); John F. Morton, The Impact of Climate Change on Smallholder and 
Subsistence Agriculture, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 19,680, 19,683–84 (2007). 
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suffer even more scarcity this century.61 For some island states such as the 
Seychelles and Micronesia, limiting global emissions is a matter of national 
survival, as rising seas are decimating their territory.62 Moreover, with 
current energy systems, it is impossible to live without emitting some 
greenhouse gases. Even so-called subsistence emissions—emissions from 
agriculture, cooking, and land clearing by the two billion poorest people63—
still constitute emissions. For a population to receive no allocation of the 
resource is theoretically to condemn them to death. 
Third, as in most triage situations, climate policy makers face a 
procrastination penalty. Just as delayed action after a natural disaster can 
exponentially increase the challenges of rescue and medical treatment, 
climate mitigation will become more expensive, technologically challenging, 
and politically polarized if serious emissions reductions are postponed until 
after 2020.64 For any given carbon budget, the later the date that emissions 
peak, the more rapidly emissions must decline thereafter. 
Finally, like allocation of food or medical care in emergencies, 
allocation of atmospheric space should be governed by some formula, 
criteria, or principle.65 Without some agreed-upon basis for allocation, 
greenhouse gas emissions will continue to rise unchecked. In triage 
contexts, such as emergency medicine, written triage protocols are used to 
ensure fair distribution of scarce resources and avoid ad hoc decision 
making in a time of crisis.66 A principled written formula is similarly needed 
for the allocation of atmospheric space. To be sure, a single numeric formula 
that allocates atmospheric space among all the nations of the world—a kind 
 
 61  See Jonathan Overpeck & Bradley Udall, Dry Times Ahead, 328 SCI. 1642, 1643 (2010) 
(citing projections that the average annual flow of the Colorado River will decrease by 20% by 
2050 and discussing the impact on southwestern cities). 
 62  See Jon Barnett & W. Neil Adger, Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries, 61 CLIMATIC 
CHANGE 321, 327 (2003) (noting that climate change puts the sovereignty of atoll countries at 
risk); UNHCR, supra note 1, at 2; H.E. Emanuel Mori, President, Federated States of Micr., 
Address at the General Assembly of the United Nations, 67th Sess., (Sept. 27, 2012), available at 
http://gadebate.un.org/67/micronesia-federated-states; Matt Brown, Rising Sea Level Poses 
Threat to Seychelles, THE NAT’L, Feb. 12, 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/africa 
/rising-sea-level-poses-threat-to-seychelles (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
 63  See Henry Shue, Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions, 15 L. & POL’Y 39, 49–58 
(1993). 
 64  See Hansen et al., supra note 47, at 225; R.H. Socolow & S.H. Lam, Good Enough Tools 
for Global Warming Policy Making, 365 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 897, 924 (2007), 
available at http://www.princeton.edu/mae/people/faculty/socolow/socdoc/index.pdf; Naomi E. 
Vaughan et al., Climate Change Mitigation: Trade-Offs Between Delay and Strength of Action 
Required, 96 CLIMATIC CHANGE 29, 39 (2009). 
 65  See generally Kenneth V. Iserson & John C. Moskop, Triage in Medicine, Part I: Concept, 
History, and Types 49 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 275, 276 (2007), available at http:// 
adventpod.org/school/Triage.Medicine.Part1.pdf (noting that without such a formal criteria for 
allocation of medical supplies, triage would devolve into “purely ad hoc or arbitrary decisions 
about distribution of health care resources”).  
 66  See, e.g., Steven D. Salhanik et al., Use and Analysis of Field Triage Criteria for Mass 
Gatherings, PREHOSPITAL & DISASTER MED., Oct.–Dec. 2003, at 347, 347–51; see also N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.19(b), (e) (2007) (requiring written triage protocols in New York 
emergency rooms).  
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of grand solution for climate mitigation—is a remote ideal. Given the 
economic stakes, allocation in a climate treaty will be politically messy, full 
of compromises and exceptions, and it will be driven by the political and 
economic influence of the major powers. Nonetheless, the long-term success 
of a treaty also depends strongly on whether most nations perceive the 
allocation to be legitimate and fair. 
Climate negotiators have been unable to agree on a principled 
allocation system, and competing conceptions of fairness, particularly 
between developed and developing states, have been the central stumbling 
block to reaching agreement. Large developing nations such as India 
contend that global warming has been caused largely by affluent developed 
nations and that it is unjust to limit developing country emissions—and their 
aspirations for further growth—while hundreds of millions of their citizens 
still live in poverty.67 Developed nations contend that these equity claims 
from the developing world are an obstacle to reaching an agreement and 
that any agreement must limit developing country emissions because most 
of the future emissions growth is in the developing world.68 
In their controversial 2010 book, Climate Change Justice, Eric Posner 
and David Weisbach argue that equity and fairness concerns need to be 
sidelined in climate change treaty negotiations to convince the major 
emitters to ratify any treaty.69 But poor developing states have not allowed 
that sidelining to occur—equity has been a consistent theme of developing 
country negotiating positions over twenty-five years of talks.70 As Amy 
Sinden has noted, when it comes to climate change mitigation, the 
“developed world is speaking the language of economics while the 
developing world speaks the language of justice.”71 
With these four features of the climate crisis—zero-sum allocation, lives 
at stake, the procrastination penalty, and the need for some principled 
allocation formula—climate change mitigation strongly resembles triage. 
Triage accurately describes the choices we face in law, politics, and ethics. 
2. Intergenerational Climate Change Triage 
The intergenerational aspects of climate change make the triage 
choices even more complex. Greenhouse gases added to the atmosphere 
today have a lifetime of several centuries, and the impacts of emissions are 
 
 67  POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 22, at 3. 
 68  Id. The largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world is China, followed by the United 
States, the European Union (excluding Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), India, the Russian 
Federation, Japan, and Canada. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Data, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
 69  POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 22, at 4. 
 70  Paul G. Harris, Common but Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and 
United States Policy, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 27, 30–33 (1999) (explaining that the principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibility” has influenced international environmental 
agreements since the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer). 
 71  Amy Sinden, Allocating the Costs of the Climate Crisis: Efficiency Versus Justice, 85 
WASH. L. REV. 293, 296 (2010). 
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back loaded. The warming impact of current emissions will be felt decades 
from now.72 As a result, the limited carbon budget is zero-sum not just among 
nations, but also across generations. Ideally, we should be planning for a 
pathway of declining emissions over the course of a hundred years or more.73 
Without that kind of triage planning, the present generation can easily draw 
on the benefits of burning fossil fuel and deforesting land today while 
externalizing the cost to future generations. Since every generation will face 
the same incentives to keep their own energy cheap and live large while 
leaving the consequences for the future, there is a serious intergenerational 
collective action problem. Stephen Gardiner refers to this passing of the 
buck as a “moral corruption” that plagues our decision making about climate 
change.74 
There is a serious question whether international law can help to 
constrain this moral corruption. Since any climate change treaty will be 
negotiated and ratified by the present generation, there will always be a 
tendency to postpone the difficult emissions reductions for decades. With 
some exceptions, such as the 1963 treaty banning above-ground nuclear 
testing,75 international law has not had to confront the interests of the 
unborn so squarely. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the numerous issues 
of intergenerational justice raised by the climate crisis, and these issues 
have been explored elsewhere.76 But it is important to view the triage 
situation clearly: it is not only the presently living, but also descendants yet 
to come, who are legitimate claimants on the resource of a stable and 
habitable climate. As the Oxford philosopher Henry Shue has explained, 
“‘[i]ntergenerational equity’ is not an additional peripheral aspect of the 
[climate change] question that we may optionally take up or not, as we 
choose.”77 Rather, “the central question is essentially intergenerational.”78 
What would intergenerational climate change triage look like? 
Allocating the limited absorptive capacity of the atmosphere across 
generations would mean that the present generation would have to 
determine what part of remaining atmospheric capacity is legitimately ours 
and what part must be preserved for our descendants. Policy makers might 
 
 72  See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1106–07 (Stocker et al. eds, 
2013), available at http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf 
(describing the long lifetimes of certain greenhouse gases and their persistent effect on 
planetary warming).  
 73  Id. at 1108 (explaining that stabilizing global temperatures will take centuries to 
millennia).  
 74  GARDINER, supra note 9, at xii–xiii, 8 (noting that because we are “judges in our own 
case,” it is “all too easy to slip into weak and self-serving ways of thinking”).  
 75  Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under 
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. 
 76  See, e.g., GARDINER, supra note 9, at 32; DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE 
18 (2010); POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 22, at 144–45; Edith Brown Weiss, Climate Change, 
Intergenerational Equity, and International Law, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 615, 616 (2007).  
 77  HENRY SHUE, SBSTA TECHNICAL BRIEFING: HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITY 6 (2009), available at 
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/1_shue_rev.pdf. 
 78  Id. 
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even set aside some reserve capacity, such that the present generation 
would conserve some portion of the emissions budget. In practice, however, 
policy makers have never seriously considered reserving limited 
atmospheric space in this way, despite paying lip service to the needs of 
future generations in various treaties and declarations.79 
C. The Current Allocation of the Atmospheric Resource 
The international law of climate change has emerged over the past 
twenty-five years without any clear allocation rules.80 As a consequence, a 
default allocation of atmospheric space is occurring. 
The present allocation can best be described as a free-for-all. With 
limited exceptions, such as the European Union and other jurisdictions that 
have put emissions reduction targets and measures into domestic law,81 
nations may emit greenhouse gases without constraint, taking from the 
carbon budget as much as they want and externalizing the ecological costs. 
Despite research on low-carbon energy supplies, biofuels, energy efficiency, 
and forest preservation, as well as twenty gatherings of the Conference of 
the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), global emissions keep rising.82 There is a “pivotal disjuncture” 
between governments’ professed aspirations and the policies they have 
actually put in place.83 
 
 79  See, e.g., UN Conference on Environment and Development, Apr. 30–May 9, 1992, 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II) Add.1, Annex 1, 4 
(May 15, 1992) (noting that the parties are “[d]etermined to protect the climate system for 
present and future generations”).  
 80  The 1997 Kyoto Protocol did impose binding emissions reductions targets on 41 nations 
listed in Annex 1 of the Protocol. Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, Dec. 10, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 
148. However, the largest-emitting Annex I nation, the United States—which represented almost 
25% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 1997—never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and the 
greenhouse gas reduction commitments under the Protocol expired in 2012. Id. at art. 3.  
 81  The European Union has committed to a 20% reduction in its greenhouse gas emissions 
below its 1990 levels by 2020. See EUR. COMM’N, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION: 
ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS TO MOVE BEYOND 20% GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTIONS AND ASSESSING THE 
RISK OF CARBON LEAKAGE 2 (2010), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content 
/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0265&from=FR. California has enacted legislation requiring 
the state to achieve its 1990 greenhouse gas emissions levels by 2020. CAL. GOV. CODE § 14000.6 
(West 2014). Ninety nations made non-binding pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 
the 2011 Cancun Agreement. UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, Cancun, Mex., Nov. 29–Dec. 
10, 2010, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-
term Cooperative Action under the Convention, ¶ 36, 49, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 
(Mar. 15, 2011). However, only 42 of these nations (mostly in Europe) committed to quantified, 
economy-wide emissions reduction targets. UNFCCC, Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice & Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Compilation of economy-wide 
emission reduction targets to be implemented by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention, 
June 6–16, 2011, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SB/2011/INF.1/Rev.1 (June 7, 2011).  
 82  James Hansen et al., Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction of 
Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 1 
(2013), available at http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10 
.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0081648&representation=PDF. 
 83  Anderson & Bows, supra note 50, at 20, 23. 
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The free-for-all use of the atmosphere has been the default allocation 
since the dawn of the industrial revolution,84 so there is enormous disparity 
in the cumulative emissions of countries, depending on when they began to 
industrialize and their rate of growth. For example, the United States is 
responsible for nearly 30% of the greenhouse gases emitted since 1850, 
whereas Mexico is responsible for 1% and Indonesia for 0.5%.85 Per capita 
emissions and emissions per unit of GDP also remain highly unequal across 
nations.86 The average Australian, for example, emits over fifty times more 
carbon dioxide annually than the average Cambodian.87 
There is no attempt in the status quo allocation to redress past 
inequities in the use of atmospheric space. There is also little discussion of 
which allocation formula for emissions rights would best promote overall 
human welfare––let alone the welfare of other species or ecosystems. The 
current distribution simply does not reflect any principled allocation 
method. As Amy Sinden has observed, “no matter how we conceptualize the 
question [of emissions allocations] from the perspective of justice, a status 
quo distribution consistently emerges as the worst solution.”88 
The status quo is an allocation of limited atmospheric space. It 
proceeds, however, under no principle, plan, or agreement, with no realistic 
prospect that the world will actually meet the two degree goal it has set for 
itself. One hundred and fifty years ago, Walt Whitman, observing the carnage 
of a Civil War battlefield, wrote that there was “no system, no foresight, no 
genius”89 in the allocation of medical attention for the soldiers. The same 
might be said about our laissez-faire approach to greenhouse gas emissions 
today. 
Even if we were to set aside principles of justice and assess current 
greenhouse gas emissions patterns purely from the standpoint of efficiency, 
the distribution can hardly be said to be Pareto optimal. The default 
allocation is plagued by externalities because producers and consumers of 
fossil fuels are not obliged to take into account the ecological and human 
harm from their activities. In April 2013, the consulting firm TruCost 
calculated the cost of environmental externalities from over five hundred 
industries in twenty-two different regions of the world.90 The peer-reviewed 
 
 84  See, e.g., Sjur Kasa, Industrial Revolutions and Environmental Problems, in CONFLUENCE: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY COMMUNICATIONS 2007/2008, at 70, 70–71 (Willy Østreng ed., 2009) (examining 
the environmental impact of industry since the start of the Industrial Revolution). 
 85  KEVIN A. BAUMERT ET AL., WORLD RES. INST., NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS: GREENHOUSE GAS 
DATA AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 32 fig.6.1 (2005).  
 86  PBL NETHERLANDS ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY, TRENDS IN GLOBAL CO2 EMISSIONS: 2013 
REPORT 18–19 figs.2.4 & 2.5 (2013). 
 87 See The World Bank, CO2 Emissions (Metric Tons Per Capita) tbl.3.8, http://data.worldba 
nk.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC/countries/1W-AU-KH?display=default (last visited Nov. 22, 
2014). 
 88  Sinden, supra note 71, at 297. 
 89  WALT WHITMAN, SPECIMEN DAYS 35 (David R. Godine, ed. 1971) (1882). 
 90  TRUCOST, NATURAL CAPITAL AT RISK: THE TOP 100 EXTERNALITIES OF BUSINESS 63 app. 3, 77 
app. 5 (2013). TruCost defined global regions according to the United Nations’ classification of 
sub-continental regions. Id. at 15, 77 app. 5. It then assessed impacts for over 500 business 
sectors in those regions. Id. 
5_TOJCI.SACHS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2015  5:14 PM 
2014] CLIMATE CHANGE TRIAGE 1011 
study concluded that of the twenty industries with the highest ecological 
impact, including steel manufacturing, electricity generation, and farming, 
not a single one would be profitable if the industries had to fully internalize 
the cost of their ecological damage.91 
To put the current situation in the language of triage, the largest 
industries in the world are free to ignore the impacts of their production and 
consumption decisions on the scarce resource. Collectively, we are treating 
the scarce resource as if it is not scarce. 
D. Triage Without Triage Personnel 
Climate change triage differs from traditional triage contexts in one 
fundamental respect: there are no duly empowered triage personnel in the 
climate context that can develop allocation principles, enforce them, and 
restrict access to the scarce resource. The parties making decisions on 
allocation include, at least formally, over 190 countries involved in the 
UNFCCC negotiations.92 Each nation is self-interested in the allocation 
outcome, whereas in traditional triage contexts such as emergency medicine 
or organ donation triage personnel generally have no personal stake.93 Some 
scholars have suggested that the UN process is fundamentally unworkable 
and that climate change negotiations should be conducted among smaller 
blocs or “clubs” of nations, such as the Major Economies Forum.94 But even 
within these smaller groups, nations still have a vested interest in the 
allocation outcome. 
At first glance, the lack of authoritative triage personnel suggests that it 
will be impossible to implement any principled allocation formula. There is 
no global sovereign to devise such a formula. There is no global enforcement 
body. There is no one with monopoly control over the resource to decide on 
an optimal allocation. Any party, moreover, can blow up a carefully arranged 
 
 91  Id. at 31 fig.5.2, 32. In estimating externalities from carbon emissions, TruCost adopted 
the Stern Review’s figure for the social cost of carbon, adjusted for inflation to $106 per metric 
ton CO2 (2009). Id. at 10. The social cost of carbon represents the present value of current and 
future economic damage caused by each additional ton of carbon emissions. WILLIAM 
NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE OPTIONS ON GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES 11 
(2008). Other studies have relied on a lower social cost of carbon to estimate externalities. See, 
e.g., id. at 11 (estimating the social cost of carbon at $30 per ton of carbon or approximately $8 
per ton of CO2 (2005)); WILLIAM NORDHAUS, ESTIMATES OF THE SOC. COST OF CARBON: 
BACKGROUND AND RESULTS FROM THE RICE-2011 MODEL 1 (2011) (setting the social cost of 
carbon at $12 per ton of CO2 for 2015 (2005)). In May 2013, the United States government 
revised its social cost of carbon to $37 per ton of CO2 for 2015, in 2007 dollars. See INTERAGENCY 
WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, at 3 (2013). The working group 
based its calculation on three peer-reviewed models and applied a 3% discount rate. Id. at 2. 
 92  See UNFCCC, Parties to the Convention and Observer States, http://unfccc.int 
/parties_and_observers/parties/items/2352.php (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
 93  See generally George P. Smith II, Re-Shaping the Common Good in Times of Public 
Health Emergencies: Validating Medical Triage, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 12 (2009).  
 94  See DAVID G. VICTOR, GLOBAL WARMING GRIDLOCK: CREATING MORE EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES 
FOR PROTECTING THE PLANET 22–24, 242–45 (2011). 
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climate allocation scheme by defecting from treaty obligations. If, as Hobbes 
argued, the conditions for justice can exist only within a sovereign state, 
then perhaps globalizing principles of justice within a climate change treaty 
is a fanciful proposition.95 
Although a just allocation cannot be imposed by fiat within the 
international system, it can still be negotiated. The UNFCCC negotiations 
should be viewed as a forum for a “‘negotiated justice’ settlement”96 in which 
nations bargain over the terms of a fair contractual arrangement that serves 
their common interest in climate stability. For a treaty to be widely ratified 
and enter into force, parties must perceive it to be fair, and ultimately the 
parties will need to address the problem of vast inequities in use rights. A 
principled allocation formula is admittedly more difficult to achieve through 
negotiations than in a domestic triage context, where a formula can be 
imposed, but it is not impossible. 
Though no nation is in charge of the triage that needs to take place, it is 
also clear that some nations matter more than others. The United States, 
Canada, China, the European Union, Japan, Russia, and India are the 
lynchpins of the system. Together they are responsible for more than 70% of 
global emissions, and with their economic and political influence, they have 
the corresponding power to shape the negotiations.97 Meanwhile, the forty-
three members of the Alliance of Small Island States, a negotiating bloc 
within the UN talks, are collectively responsible for about 0.5% of global 
emissions, yet many of these nations will disappear as the oceans rise.98 In 
this context, the major emitters, though not exactly akin to triage personnel, 
certainly have an outsized influence on utilizing atmospheric space and 
keeping emissions with a carbon budget. 
III. TRIAGE ETHICS IN CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
Given the close parallels between climate change mitigation and 
traditional applications of triage, climate policy makers ought to consider 
triage ethics in developing options for allocation. The literature on triage 
ethics—developed in contexts such as battlefield trauma, emergency 
medicine, and disaster response—helps to illuminate some of the core 
questions of equity and justice in climate change law. 
This Part explores the triage ethics literature and identifies three 
principles of distributive justice that could potentially guide a climate 
change allocation scheme: utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and market-based 
 
 95  See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113, 114, 
121–22 (2005).  
 96  J. Timmons Roberts & Bradley C. Parks, Fueling Injustice: Globalization, Ecologically 
Unequal Exchange and Climate Change, 4 GLOBALIZATIONS 193, 204 (2007). 
 97  BAUMERT ET AL., supra note 85, at 11–14.  
 98  See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE LEAST DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES, LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES, THE 
IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS OF THE LEAST DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES AND SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES 12 (2009). 
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distribution. After considering the benefits and drawbacks of each, this 
Article concludes that egalitarian principles provide the fairest basis for 
emerging climate change law. This Part also addresses the role of corrective 
justice—redress and compensation—in both climate change law and in 
triage. 
A. The Triage Ethics Literature 
Most historians date the first formal triage protocols to the Napoleonic 
Wars.99 Baron Dominique-Jean Larrey, chief surgeon of Napoleon’s Imperial 
Guard, developed what he called a system of “prompt and methodical 
succor” for the battlefield wounded.100 In his 1812 notes on Napoleon’s 
Russian campaign, Larrey wrote: “Those who are dangerously wounded 
should receive the first attention, without regard to rank or distinction. They 
who are injured in a less degree may wait until their brethren in arms, who 
are badly mutilated, have been operated on and dressed.”101 
For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, writing on triage 
ethics focused on the battlefield setting.102 Since the 1960s, however, writers 
have also turned their attention to the triage decisions triggered by new 
medical technology, such as neonatal intensive care, organ transplant, and 
kidney dialysis.103 Much of the writing on triage ethics has appeared within 
specialized trade journals, and there have been a few book-length treatments 
as well.104 
A major lesson of this literature is that triage conditions trigger 
situational ethics.105 Conditions can deteriorate to a point where ordinary 
methods for allocating resources no longer seem appropriate. In warfare or 
natural disasters, for example, triage ethics may require health care workers 
to neglect some victims, purposely, to save others.106 Common allocation 
mechanisms for triage—such as lotteries, rationing, and queuing—would 
seem bizarre or intolerable in the ordinary practice of medicine. Triage 
 
 99  Iserson & Moskop, supra note 65, at 277.  
 100  Robert Baker & Martin Strosberg, Triage and Equality: An Historical Reassessment of 
Utilitarian Analysis of Triage, 2 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 103, 110 (1992). 
 101  Iserson & Moskop, supra note 65, at 277. 
 102  See GERALD R. WINSLOW, TRIAGE AND JUSTICE 1–11 (1982) (tracing triage practices in 
military medicine). 
 103  Id. at 11–21 (discussing triage debates in the 1960s and 1970s regarding kidney dialysis 
and transplant). 
 104  See, e.g., id.; see also, e.g., RUTH GAARE BERNHEIM ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
ETHICS (2013); CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 54; DÓNAL P. O’MATHÚNA ET AL., DISASTER 
BIOETHICS: NORMATIVE ISSUES WHEN NOTHING IS NORMAL (Michael J. Selgelid ed., 2014). 
 105  See The World Med. Ass’n, WMA Statement on Medical Ethics in the Event of Disasters, 
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/d7/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (“Triage may 
pose an ethical problem owing to the limited treatment resources immediately available in 
relation to the large number of injured persons in varying states of health.”).  
 106  See Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of 
Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEX. L. REV. 541, 586 (1993) (“In medical triage, doctors defer working on 
those patients who cannot be saved, or whose rescue would require disproportionate attention, 
time, and resources, even if it means that those patients will probably die.”).  
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conditions may require modification of legal rules as well as ethical rules. 
For instance, many U.S. states relax their licensing standards for medical 
professionals in times of natural disaster and allow a wider array of 
procedures to be performed under various licenses.107 
The diversity of settings in which triage can arise forces us to consider 
the ethical principles that should apply for the extraordinary exigencies of 
particular dire situations. At the extreme, where scarcity is so dire that it 
threatens the collapse of society, some philosophers, including Hume, have 
suggested that there is no possibility of justice, and the only ethic is one of 
self-preservation. As Hume wrote, “where the society is ready to perish from 
extreme necessity, no greater evil can be dreaded from violence and 
injustice; and every man may now provide for himself by all the means, 
which prudence can dictate, or humanity permit.”108  
Global warming has not yet reached a point where there is an 
impossibility of just outcomes. As we face an era of ecological overshoot, 
the triage lens offers some hope that just solutions to the climate crisis can 
still be reached. 
B. Substantive Principles for Triage 
There are three potential principles for allocating scarce resources 
under triage conditions: utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and market-based 
distribution. Each is considered here. 
1. Utilitarian Triage Ethics 
In the triage literature, it is frequently stated that triage is a utilitarian 
exercise: the goal is to save as many lives as possible, given severe resource 
constraints.109 According to Peter Baskett, a British physician who pioneered 
advanced life support techniques, triage means “[d]o as little as possible, for 
as many as possible, as quickly as possible.”110 In practice, utilitarian triage 
may require sacrificing individuals who require too many resources needed 
by other patients. As a World War I military surgery manual stated, “[a] 
single case, even if it urgently requires attention . . . may have to wait, for in 
 
 107  See James G. Hodge, Jr., Lance A. Gable & Stephanie H. Cálves, The Legal Framework 
for Meeting Surge Capacity Through the Use of Volunteer Health Professionals During Public 
Health Emergencies and Other Disasters, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 5, 48 (2005) 
(advocating relaxation of licensing standards to increase the supply of health professionals 
during emergencies). Many states, moreover, allow temporary governmental taking of private 
property to address emergencies, including not only hotel space and other facilities that could 
be used for emergency housing, but also pharmaceuticals and other medical supplies. See, e.g., 
D.C. CODE § 7-2304 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-51 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:769 (2013); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:13-9, 26:13-11 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-10A-6 (2013). 
 108  DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 19 (2d ed. 1966) (1777). 
 109  Matthew D. Sztajnkrycer et al., Unstable Ethical Plateaus and Disaster Triage, 24 
EMERGENCY MED. CLINICS N. AM. 749, 751 (2006). 
 110  Id. at 756 (quoting Peter J. F. Baskett, Ethics in Disaster Medicine, 9 PREHOSPITAL & 
DISASTER MED. 4 (1994)). 
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that same time a dozen others, almost equally exigent, but requiring less 
time, might be cared for. The greatest good of the greatest number must be 
the rule.”111 
Within this utilitarian framework, triage rests on a prioritization of 
interests. Treatment is ordinarily prioritized to those with a realistic 
prognosis for recovery due to the intervention, and it is denied to those who 
have little chance of medical success even with the intervention.112 
Treatment of the latter group would simply be an unacceptable waste of 
time and resources. 
Benthamite utilitarianism has intuitive appeal in triage. Few people 
quarrel with using medical success as a primary criterion for triage in 
battlefield, emergency room, and Intensive Care Unit settings.113 Virtually all 
scholars of triage ethics have endorsed it.114 When confronted with scarcity 
and overwhelming need, it is natural to ask the question: How can this 
resource be deployed so it will do the most good? 
Applying utilitarian triage ethics can be difficult in practice, however. In 
addition to the practical challenges of accurately and rapidly assessing the 
medical condition of claimants on the resource, there is also a larger, 
structural challenge in utilitarian triage: defining the “greatest good for the 
greatest number.”115 
In battlefield triage, for example, we assume that utilitarianism means 
using scarce resources to save the largest possible number of wounded 
soldiers.116 But medical personnel sometimes prioritize the current fighting 
strength of a unit, rather than saving the largest possible number of 
soldiers.117 Military physicians have prioritized aid to soldiers who have slight 
injuries, rather than severe injuries, so the soldiers can get back to the 
battlefield as soon as possible.118 
 
 111  Iserson & Moskop, supra note 65, at 277 (quoting W.W. KEEN, THE TREATMENT OF WAR 
WOUNDS 20 (1917)). 
 112  Id. at 284. 
 113  Baker & Strosberg, supra note 100, at 113, 115; see also Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Guidelines for Field Triage of Injured Patients, 61 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. 
REP. 1, 2, 17 (2012). 
 114  See Baker & Strosberg, supra note 100, at 107 (quoting Nat’l Inst. of Health Consensus 
Dev. Conference Statement, Critical Care Medicine, Mar. 7–9, 1983, available at 
http://consensus.nih.gov/1983/1983CriticalCare035html.htm) (“It is not medically appropriate to 
devote limited ICU resources to patients without reasonable prospect of significant recovery 
when patients who need those services, and who have a significant prospect of recovery from 
acutely life-threatening disease or injury are being turned away due to lack of capacity.”). 
 115  See, e.g., Nicholas Rescher, The Allocation of Exotic Medical Lifesaving Therapy, 79 
ETHICS 173, 177, 182–83 (1969). 
 116  Baker & Strosberg, supra note 100, at 104. 
 117  Id. at 104, 120. 
 118  WINSLOW, supra note 102, at 6. In a well-known example of this practice, military 
physicians in North Africa during World War II gave their first shipments of penicillin to soldiers 
who contracted gonorrhea in brothels rather than to soldiers injured in battle. Iserson & 
Moskop, supra note 65, at 277. The theory was that those with gonorrhea could be cured in a 
matter of days with the penicillin and get back to fighting, whereas those with more serious 
injuries could take weeks to get back to the front, even with the penicillin. Baker & Strosberg, 
supra note 100, at 104. Similarly, a U.S. Army Technical Bulletin from 1955 stated that under 
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In the hospital setting, what “good” should be maximized in triage 
decisions? There are many potential options. A utilitarian ranking for 
treatment could certainly be based on a patient’s degree of injury or on the 
prospects for medical success, but it also could be based on a patient’s 
projected life span or quality of remaining life—a maximization of so-called 
Quality-Adjusted Life Years.119 To maximize societal welfare, rather than the 
welfare of a group of patients, a utilitarian triage ethic might give priority to 
patients with dependent children, to patients who employ many individuals 
in their business, or to patients deemed to have high social worth.120 Triage 
ethicists have debated whether triage should consider patients’ past or 
potential contributions to society as well as their misdeeds, such as criminal 
convictions.121 
In short, even in battlefield and hospital contexts, utility itself is a 
contestable concept. Utilitarianism requires some consensus on the good to 
be maximized and corresponding decisions on which claimants shall take 
priority. Utilitarianism remains a foundational principle for allocating 
resources in triage, but it is a constrained form of utilitarianism.122 It is 
utilitarianism focused on improving survival rates for needy claimants, not 
on promoting overall societal good. 
2. Egalitarian Triage Ethics 
While utilitarian ethics dominate in battlefield and emergency room 
triage, there is a distinct class of triage situations in which egalitarian ethics 
prevail. In allocation of emergency food and shelter after a disaster, 
allocation of scarce antibiotics during a bacterial outbreak, or allocation of 
organs for transplant, most ethical guidelines for triage are strongly 
egalitarian.123 The driving concern is equality—equal access to the scarce 
good. Triage protocols for these contexts usually ignore wealth, age, race, 
 
conditions of thermonuclear attack, medical attention for soldiers should not be given to the 
severely injured, but rather to those who would be able to return to military duty after minimal 
treatment, such as “[t]hose with small lacerations or contusions.” Thomas J. O’Donnell, S.J., The 
Morality of Triage, 14 GEO. MED. BULL. 68, 70–71 (1960). 
 119  See Baker & Strosberg, supra note 100, at 108 (defining “quality adjusted life-year” as a 
utilitarian triage factor that weighs remaining length of life against quality of life). 
 120  See WINSLOW, supra note 102, at 33 (discussing a heart transplant panel’s rejection of 
social worth criteria for triage). In the early debates over organ donation in the 1960s, 
University of Pittsburgh philosopher Nicholas Rescher was the leading advocate for the 
position that a patient’s social worth should be used as a utilitarian triage criterion, on the 
grounds that when investing a scarce resource in one person instead of another, society is 
entitled to look to the probable prospective societal gain. Id. at 84. 
 121  E.g., George P. Smith, II, Triage: Endgame Realities, J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y, 
Spring 1985, at 143, 145. 
 122  See Nikki Pesik et al., Terrorism and the Ethics of Emergency Medical Care, 37 ANNALS 
EMERGENCY MED. 642, 644–45 (2001) (arguing that in utilitarian medical triage, the only 
permissible prioritization should be likelihood of recovery, amount of resources required, and 
whether the person’s survival is important to save others). 
 123  See Meir Katz, Bioterrorism and Public Law: The Ethics of Scarce Medical Resource 
Allocation in Mass Casualty Situations, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 805 (2008) (discussing how 
egalitarianism plays a critical role in emergency situations). 
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religion, gender, military rank, and ability to pay.124 Unlike utilitarian 
allocations, egalitarian allocations typically do not include individualized 
assessments of the medical condition of the claimants. 
Egalitarian triage allocation methods include lottery, first-come-first-
served, or, where possible, an equal per capita distribution of the resource.125 
Efficiency is still relevant in these egalitarian allocations. It would be 
wasteful to hand out scarce resources to those who cannot benefit from 
them. But once initial categorizations have been made to determine who is 
in need and who can benefit (as in organ donor matching), the actual 
distribution of the resource in triage situations is frequently egalitarian.126 
Egalitarianism is the dominant approach in these contexts for a few 
reasons. First, there may be many hundreds or thousands of claimants on 
the resource, unlike battlefield or emergency room triage, where the task is 
to prioritize among a smaller group. Second, within the class of claimants in 
need, the need of each individual for food, shelter, or medicine is roughly the 
same, making it difficult to establish a prioritization hierarchy. Third, the 
scarce resource is often divisible into roughly equal portions, unlike medical 
attention on the battlefield or in a hospital. Some resources, such as kidneys, 
cannot be subdivided, of course, but others, such as food and water, can be 
almost infinitely subdivided to produce equal portions for those in need.127 
Like utilitarian triage ethics, egalitarian triage ethics raise a host of 
implementation issues. The most significant issue is how to measure 
equality. There are three main alternatives. First, equality could be 
determined by equality of an opportunity to receive aid—as in a lottery 
system—even if this means that many who applied for the lottery are denied 
aid altogether. Second, equality could be conceived as equalizing amounts of 
a resource distributed to claimants (the per capita option). Third, equality 
could be conceived as a kind of guarantee of equal outcomes, in which those 
most in need would receive more of the resource. Under this approach, the 
frail and sick would receive more aid (food, water, blankets, etc.) on the 
grounds that more aid is needed to restore them to a baseline of health. 
The main disadvantage of egalitarian allocations in triage situations is 
that there is typically no individualized assessment of claimants’ need for the 
resource. Such an individualized ranking of the needy might save more lives 
overall because it avoids the distribution of a scarce resource to those with 
lower priority needs. Such a ranking, however, takes time and resources for 
triage personnel. This is one reason why egalitarian allocations of scarce 
life-saving resources are common after natural disasters affecting large 
populations, where there is neither the time nor the resources to undertake 
individualized assessments of need. 
 
 124  KATHY KINLAW & ROBERT LEVINE, ETHICAL GUIDELINES IN PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 7 (2007). 
 125  Sztajnkrycer et al., supra note 109, at 759–60. 
 126  See, e.g., WINSLOW, supra note 102, at 33 (noting that if two candidates for a heart 
transplant present themselves with roughly equivalent medical need, the transplant recipient 
“should be selected by some random method”).  
 127  Id. at 43 (“Some scarce resources can be divided and subdivided into smaller and smaller 
portions. The smaller amounts may be less effective and yet still be better than nothing.”).  
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3. Market-Based Distributions in Triage 
The third potential principle for allocating scarce resources is market-
based distribution. Triage personnel could auction off scarce goods or sell 
them for some fixed price, and those who successfully obtain the good could 
sell it or trade it. Such a plan would lead to different outcomes compared to 
a utilitarian or an egalitarian allocation. In a utilitarian allocation, the triage 
personnel must decide the prioritization rules that will benefit the most 
number of claimants. In contrast, in a market-based distribution, the triage 
personnel would remain agnostic on prioritization, and the market itself 
would determine the distribution. That distribution, grounded in ability to 
pay, is highly unlikely to lead to a uniform, equal distribution of a good 
among a population. 
Most scarce goods, including finite natural resources, are routinely 
distributed through the market. Copper, oil, timber, and oceanfront real 
estate are sought after and valuable, yet we do not ordinarily think that these 
resources need to be triaged through some governmental or collective 
decision making to direct them to their highest use. Even when the 
government has taken exclusive control over a scarce resource, such as 
radio spectrum, market-based auction remains a common allocation 
mechanism.128 No one expects egalitarian outcomes in these situations, and 
we do not typically view the losers in the market—those who are outbid for 
the resource—as having suffered a tragedy. 
If a market-based distribution were applied in a triage situation, it 
would avoid the need for triage personnel—whom we assume have near-
monopoly control over the resource—to assess the individual needs and 
condition of claimants. The price offered by claimants would instead reflect 
their own assessment of their need and their opportunity costs. A market-
based distribution could potentially raise revenue that society could use for 
broader health care goals or for securing additional supplies of the scarce 
resource. 
The major disadvantage of a market-based distribution of scarce life-
saving goods is that it privileges willingness to pay or ability to pay as the 
criteria for allocation. There are strong moral objections to giving such 
primacy to wealth in triage, because wealth is so heavily influenced by 
family history, race, gender, geography, and other factors unrelated to 
medical need.129 Indeed, if market principles were to govern triage, the 
scarce resource may very well be delivered to those who have no need for it, 
but merely think they have a need for it or want to stockpile it. In addition, 
in many triage situations, those in need of a scarce resource are on the verge 
of death. They are in no position to bid in this particular marketplace. 
Triaged goods are survival goods—goods necessary for life itself. 
Unlike other kinds of scarce goods typically distributed through the market, 
there is intense concern in triage for the welfare of the losers—those 
 
 128  Terrence J. Schroepfer, Allocating Spectrum Through the Use of Auctions, 14 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 35, 36 (1991–1992). 
 129  Sztajnkrycer et al., supra note 109, at 759. 
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claimants who do not become recipients—and we often view the losers as 
having suffered a tragedy. Triage personnel understand the moral gravity of 
these allocation decisions. In a study of the psychological health of triage 
practitioners, researchers noted that the practitioners experience feelings of 
“doubt, discomfort, and other forms of ethical dissonance before, during and 
after a process of prioritization of resources and services.”130 Triage 
personnel rarely use a market-based distribution of scarce resources, and in 
the literature on triage ethics, it is widely accepted that willingness or ability 
to pay should not be criteria for allocation.131 
C. Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Market in Climate Change 
Mitigation 
In climate change triage, which of these different allocation principles 
should govern the allocation of the limited carbon budget? 
A market-based approach to climate change triage would be highly 
problematic. Assume, for example, that the limited remaining carbon budget 
were simply auctioned off to nations. The vast differences in wealth among 
nations are in large part due to past consumption of fossil fuels and 
associated emissions of greenhouse gases.132 To make those wealth 
differences the primary criterion for deciding which nations should enjoy 
future rights to emit greenhouse gases would be morally perverse. There is 
simply no reason to make the existing distribution of wealth among nations 
the foundation for long-term allocation decisions regarding the available 
carbon budget. For this same reason, an approach that requires nations to 
reduce their emissions by a certain percentage from a baseline year is also 
unjust because the widely varying emissions in a baseline year are not 
morally relevant grounds for an allocation program that may last decades.133 
Another problem with a market distribution is that in a hypothetical 
market auction of atmospheric space, or emissions rights, it is likely that the 
wealthiest countries would acquire the vast majority of the resource, leaving 
none for the poorest countries. Such a program of market allocation, causing 
emissions starvation for the poorest countries, is morally unjust and would 
never be agreed to consensually through a treaty. 
 
 130  Norman Linzer et al., Terror and Triage, 7 ANNALS OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1, 1 (2008). 
 131  As three experts in disaster triage concluded, a “free-market system of resource 
allocation, based in large part on ability to pay, has [no] role in resource allocation during a 
disaster,” at least with respect to publicly provided necessities. Id.  
 132  See STEVEN VANDERHEIDEN, ATMOSPHERIC JUSTICE: A POLITICAL THEORY OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 78–79 (2008) (stating that national greenhouse gas emissions are closely correlated 
with industrial development and national wealth). 
 133  For further discussion of the drawbacks and advantages of allocations based on 
historical baselines, see J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice 
of Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 18, 25 (2011). See also 
VANDERHEIDEN, supra note 132, at 231 (critiquing the Kyoto Protocol for relying on a 1990 
baseline year, which meant that “the United States, which had significantly higher per capita 
emissions that year than did either Europe or Japan, was allowed to maintain that wide 
disparity in average pollution levels”). 
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Between the two other approaches, egalitarianism and utilitarianism, 
egalitarianism is the preferable allocation method for atmospheric space. 
There are seven billion people who are claimants on the scarce resource, 
and there is no principled means of arranging the citizens of the world into a 
hierarchy of the “deserving,” based on wealth, nationality, race, geography, 
or perceived social worth.134 A utilitarian approach would inevitably involve 
deciding which countries “need” to emit greenhouse gases and whose needs 
should be prioritized. The atmosphere’s absorptive capacity is a common 
heritage of humanity, owned by no one.135 There is therefore a strong moral 
claim for equal allocation of atmospheric space. 
An egalitarian distribution of rights to the atmosphere can be justified 
through Rawlsian contract theory. In his classic 1982 book, Triage and 
Justice, Gerald Winslow engaged in a Rawlsian thought experiment for 
triage, exploring what rational contractors would choose as allocation 
principles for scarce goods if they were under a veil of ignorance regarding 
their own future need for the good in a triage situation.136 Winslow concluded 
that in this original position, contractors would still value utility, in the sense 
that they would want to maximize use of the scarce resource to save lives. 
However, once those individuals with a realistic chance of medical success 
were identified, Winslow argues, contractors would opt for an egalitarian 
system of equal access.137 They would rule out principles such as ability to 
pay, social worth, or just deserts.138 Using this Rawlsian analysis, Winslow 
endorsed “a fundamental presumption in favor of the justness of equal 
access to the scarce life-saving resource.”139 
In the climate change context, an egalitarian distribution would 
presumably focus on equality of distribution of the scarce resource—
atmospheric space or emissions rights—rather than more difficult-to-
measure criteria, such as equalizing individual welfare, utility, or happiness; 
or equalizing national wealth or GDP. An allocation program based on per 
capita distribution of emissions rights, within the constraints of the carbon 
budget, is the most straightforward way of operationalizing egalitarianism in 
climate change policy. 
Egalitarianism in climate change policy does not mean that every form 
of inequality among nations or among individuals must be eliminated. 
Nations differ greatly in their wealth, natural resources, human capital, 
climate change vulnerability, dependence on fossil fuels, seasonal 
temperatures, etc. Redressing the totality of these inequalities is not 
mandated by principles of justice, and it is asking far too much of a climate 
change treaty to measure its success on these grounds. 
 
 134  Henry Shue, Climate, in A COMPANION TO ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 449, 450 (Dale 
Jamieson ed., 2001); VANDERHEIDEN, supra note 132, at 108.  
 135  Robin Attfield, Environmental Values, Nationalism, Global Citizenship and the Common 
Heritage of Humanity, in ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES IN A GLOBALISING WORLD: NATURE, JUSTICE AND 
GOVERNANCE 38, 44 (Jouni Paavola & Ian Lowe eds., 2006). 
 136  WINSLOW, supra note 102, at 133. 
 137  Id. at 143–53.  
 138  Id. at 155–61.  
 139  Id. at 167. 
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Eric Posner and David Weisbach make this unreasonable demand in 
Climate Change Justice, repeatedly criticizing advocates of egalitarian 
climate policies because such policies will not achieve these lofty purported 
goals of global equity or global redistribution of wealth described above.140 
Posner and Weisbach note, for example, that Thailand, Romania, and 
Jamaica are all currently near the world average in per capita emissions and 
therefore would not have a significant change in emissions rights under a 
climate change treaty grounded in egalitarianism.141 Because these countries 
face very different impacts from climate change, Posner and Weisbach 
contend, an egalitarian distribution of emissions rights will not truly treat 
these nations equally.142 
No climate change treaty can achieve the idealized form of equality that 
Posner and Weisbach posit here. Advocates of egalitarian climate change 
policies are not suggesting that such policies could equalize per capita 
wealth or income across the globe, let alone equalize the ability of nations to 
adapt to a changing climate.143 Rather, egalitarianism in the climate change 
context means something narrower—equal distribution of the scarce good 
itself. Part IV.C outlines what such an equal per capita distribution of 
emissions rights could look like. 
It might be argued that egalitarianism is the wrong approach because it 
unnecessarily collectivizes the atmosphere and treats it as a resource in 
which every citizen of the world has an ownership stake. Other natural 
resources such as timber and minerals—even food and water necessary for 
survival—are controlled by sovereign nations and are usually used by 
nations to benefit their own citizens. Just as the citizens of Morocco have no 
legitimate claim to the water resources of Canada, this argument might run, 
the citizens of Morocco have no claim to atmospheric space being used by 
Canada’s rising greenhouse gas emissions. If we do not seek equal allocation 
of the world’s supply of food, water, or minerals—we in fact tolerate vast 
inequities in consumption144—then why should we be concerned with equal 
allocation of atmospheric space? 
 
 140  See POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 22, at 121–22, 143 (“It would be much better to 
design a treaty on the basis of fundamental normative principles, [as opposed to a per capita 
approach], while taking into account feasibility constraints . . . .”).  
 141  See id. at 125–26 (citing 2000 figures). By 2010, emissions from Romania and Thailand 
were exceeding those from Jamaica. See World Bank, CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
 142  Id. at 126 (“Jamaica may be exposed to changes in hurricane intensity in the Atlantic. 
Thailand may face changes in agricultural patterns. Both are exposed to sea-level change, while 
Romania is not. The net effects of a climate treaty with per capita allocations would be quite 
different for these countries.”). 
 143  See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 71, at 311–17 (discussing methods for allocating emissions 
rights under a per capita distribution). 
 144  See John Ashton & Xueman Wang, Equity and Climate: In Principle and Practice, in 
BEYOND KYOTO: ADVANCING THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE 61, 65 (2003), 
available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/Beyond%20Kyoto.pdf (“[Egalitarianism] is harder 
to invoke when it comes to more material goods. . . . No state, for example, shares equally 
among its citizens the benefits accruing from the extraction of its minerals . . . . Most goods are 
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The reason is that the atmosphere is fundamentally different from other 
natural resources. The atmosphere is a true global commons, owned by no 
single sovereign.145 Its absorptive capacity is scarce and cannot be 
replenished.146 There is no substitute for it. And unlike a nation’s use of food 
or water, a nation’s greenhouse gas emissions cause global externalities, 
with extensive ecological damage beyond national borders. As the British 
economist Nicholas Stern put it, climate change is “the greatest market 
failure the world has ever seen.”147 
Under these circumstances, those who want to justify vastly unequal 
use rights in the commons ought to bear a heavy burden of persuasion. It 
would be morally perverse, for example, if Canada were to argue that it has 
an “entitlement” to continued high emissions because it is a first-in-time user 
of atmospheric space or because it has built its infrastructure around a high-
emissions economy.148 Similarly, countries that have had low emissions in 
the past cannot be said to have forfeited their population’s right to the 
commons, and no country would ever be expected to consent to near-
exclusive appropriation by others. 
In contrast to egalitarianism, utilitarianism is a problematic moral 
framework for climate change triage. In a climate change treaty, allocating 
emissions rights or atmospheric capacity according to a utilitarian calculus 
would inevitably mean establishing a hierarchy of the deserving—a kind of 
rational sorting of individuals or nations. It is highly unlikely that such a 
treaty would be widely ratified or remain stable over the long term. Indeed, 
triage scholars have observed that utilitarian triage allocations almost 
always require “coercion” or “covertness” to be workable because when the 
rationing or ranking criteria become public, the triage personnel tend to lose 
their authority.149 This kind of coercive utilitarian prioritization can work on 
the battlefield and in emergency room settings because there is a clear 
command authority.150 But given the consensus nature of international 
decision making, any attempt to engage in a utilitarian ranking of the 
deserving would quickly eviscerate support for a climate change treaty. 
There is a superficial appeal in designing an allocation scheme in which 
the scarce resource of the limited carbon budget can do the most “good.” In 
 
allocated through property rights according to ability or willingness to pay, not provided equally 
to all.”). 
 145  Id. 
 146  See id. (“[E]very human has an equal stake in [the atmosphere]: an equal share of the 
total carbon space available for human activity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 147  NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW xviii (2007). 
 148  Posner and Weisbach contend that high-emitting countries such as the United States and 
Canada should receive some sort of preference in a future allocation. They note that if high-
emitting countries are severely constrained under an allocation system, they “should be 
compensated for the lost investment that they made in the reasonable expectation that rights 
would continue as in the past.” POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 22, at 136. 
 149  Baker & Strosberg, supra note 100, at 117. 
 150  See generally id. at 107, 110 (discussing both the policy developed by the National 
Institutes of Health for prioritizing care in intensive care units, and the battlefield triage system 
implemented by Napoleon’s army). 
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climate change politics, however, there is no consensus on this issue.151 What 
is the good that we should be maximizing, and what should the limited 
atmospheric budget be spent on? Is the allocation to be based on which 
nations, or individuals, can produce the most goods and services from each 
ton of greenhouse gases emitted? The most improvement in quality of life? 
Should we assume a declining marginal utility of emissions? Should 
countries such as China, the United States, and Canada, which are now 
locking in their fossil fuel infrastructure through the middle of this century,152 
have a larger entitlement to continued greenhouse gas emissions, based on 
the costs they would incur if their emissions were severely constrained? 
A utilitarian approach to climate change policy would also have to 
confront some of the classic problems of utilitarian moral theory. It could 
justify morally abhorrent treatment of some to benefit the whole, and it 
could run roughshod over competing values and tastes held by minorities 
and dissenters. Furthermore, because it takes preferences at face value, a 
utilitarian allocation scheme can be too easily influenced by the intensely 
held preferences of a few.153 
There is no doubt that utilitarian climate change policy would be 
strident and divisive. Consider the charges of cultural hegemony that would 
be raised if any group of policy makers tried to determine which nations’ 
emissions are most valuable or which population could make the best use of 
a limited allocation. 
As John Stuart Mill recognized, there are some areas of public life 
where utilitarian ethics need to be constrained. It is “inconsistent with 
justice to be partial,” he wrote, “to show favor or preference to one person 
 
 151  See UNFCCC, Mar. 13, 2013, Submission by the Like-Minded Developing Countries on 
Climate Change (LMDC) to the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action (ADP), 5, 7 (Mar. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Submission by LMDC], available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_lmdc_
workstream_1_20130313.pdf (explaining that developed countries should take the lead in 
combating climate change and reducing emissions); MASS. INST. OF TECH. ENERGY INITIATIVE, 
THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY, 132, 134–35 (2011) [hereinafter 
MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE], available at http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/NaturalGas_Chapter 
6_Infrastructure.pdf (describing recent expansion in the U.S., of natural gas infrastructure and 
future infrastructure needs through 2030); Damian Carrington, More Than 1,000 New Coal 
Plants Planned Worldwide, Figures Show, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 19, 2012, http://www.the 
guardian.com/environment/2012/nov/20/coal-plants-world-resources-institute (last visited Nov. 
22, 2014) (describing recent expansion of coal plants worldwide, particularly in China). 
 152  See Carrington, supra note 151; MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 153; Gov’t of Alberta, 
Inventory of Major Projects, http://albertacanada.com/business/statistics/inventory-of-major-
projects.aspx (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (listing hundreds of infrastructure projects to develop 
Alberta’s oil sands). 
 153  See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1974) (“Utilitarian theory is 
embarrassed by the possibility of utility monsters who get enormously greater gains in utility 
from any sacrifice of others than these others lose . . . . [T]he theory seems to require that we all 
be sacrificed in the monster’s maw, in order to increase total utility.”); Jedediah Purdy, Our 
Place in the World: A New Relationship for Environmental Ethics and Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 857, 
881–82 (2013) (arguing the utilitarianism in environmental law may lead to “disregarding or 
sacrificing inconveniently situated individuals or sloughing over values that some people 
treasure”). 
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over another in matters to which favor and preference do not properly 
apply.”154 While few would object to favoring certain injured soldiers in a 
utilitarian battlefield triage, it is highly objectionable to prefer some 
populations or nations over others in a utilitarian allocation of global 
atmospheric space. 
D. Triage and Corrective Justice 
I have focused so far on distributive justice—fairness in allocation—but 
another major issue in climate treaty negotiations is corrective justice155: the 
view, held by many developing countries, that the past wrongs of excess 
greenhouse gas emissions need to be redressed, and those nations most 
responsible for global climate disruption should compensate the victims. 
India, China, and many other countries contend that a fair climate 
change treaty should involve substantial emissions reductions by wealthy, 
developed states of the world, given the historic advantage of these states in 
emitting greenhouse gases for two centuries as the engine of their 
economies, with essentially no controls.156 In addition to emission 
reductions, developing countries have also consistently sought financial 
transfers from wealthy countries to assist with climate change adaptation 
and capacity building.157 In the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, developed 
countries committed to mobilize $100 billion per year by 2020 for such 
assistance, though it is now doubtful that such a huge amount will actually 
be appropriated.158 
 
 154  JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 67 (7th ed. 1879). 
 155  See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS: BOOK V (W. D. Ross trans., 2009) (350 B.C.E) 
(describing “rectificatory” justice, in which equality needs to be restored where “one [has] 
inflicted injury and the other has received it”). 
 156  UNFCCC, Aug. 2009, Ministry of Env’t and Forests, Gov’t of India, Climate Change 
Negotiations: India’s Submissions to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 14 [hereinafter India’s Submissions], available at http://www.moef.nic.in/sites/ 
default/files/UNFCCC_final_1.pdf; UNFCCC, July 7–31, 1997, Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin 
Mandate, Implementation of the Berlin Mandate, 4–5, 18–23, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AGBM 
/1997/MISC.1/Add.3 (May 30, 1997)  [hereinafter Berlin Mandate], available at http://unfccc.int/ 
cop5/resource/docs/1997/agbm/misc01.pdf; Submission by LMDC, supra note 151, at 5, 7; Info. 
Office of the State Council of China, China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate 
Change, Part VI (2012) [hereinafter China’s Policies], available at http://www.china.org.cn/gov 
ernment/whitepaper/node_7172407.htm (affirming the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibility”). 
 157  Copenhagen Accord, supra note 36, ¶ 8; Berlin Mandate, supra note 156, at 4–5, 23; 
Submission by LMDC, supra note 151, at 5, 7, 10. 
 158  Copenhagen Accord, supra note 36, ¶ 8. The developed countries also pledged $30 billion 
in “fast-start finance” between 2010 and 2012. Id. In 2012, the World Resources Institute 
estimated that $33.92 billion had been pledged for this early financing. Clifford Polycarp et al., 
World Res. Inst., Developed Country Fast-Start Climate Finance Pledges: A Summary of Self-
Reported Information (2012), available at http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/climate 
_finance_pledges_2012-11-26.pdf. As for long-term funding sources to mobilize $100 billion per 
year by 2020, the parties have not yet reached agreement, and the outlook remains highly 
uncertain. Yulia Yamineva & Kati Kulovesi, The New Framework for Climate Finance Under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Breakthrough or an Empty 
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Corrective justice has intuitive appeal in many decisions involving 
natural resources. It would be unjust, for example, if one family recklessly 
pollutes a village well and then suggests an equal method for allocating any 
remaining drinking water in the village. Such a purely egalitarian distribution 
would ignore how the well became polluted in the first place. The family 
might pay some compensation to the rest of the village, and the family’s 
responsibility for polluting the well should be a factor in the future 
allocation of the remaining water. 
Posner and Weisbach have criticized the application of corrective 
justice principles to climate change because of the intergenerational nature 
of the problem. They contend that it would be unjust to punish the current 
population of wealthy countries by making them pay compensation for the 
harm done by emissions of their parents and grandparents.159 Cass Sunstein 
made the same argument in an article co-authored with Posner.160 As Dan 
Farber shows, however, a compensation obligation in a climate change 
treaty would not necessarily punish current affluent populations for the sins 
of the past.161 The United States, for example, has emitted 53.5% of its total 
greenhouse gas emissions since 1970, during the lifetimes of the majority of 
Americans alive today.162 
The literature on triage ethics rarely addresses issues of corrective 
justice. Concepts such as punishment for past misdeeds or allocation of aid 
according to just deserts are foreign to triage practice. There are two 
reasons for this. First, triage is usually a one-time event—a tragic allocation 
under difficult conditions unlikely to be repeated. The emergency requires 
immediate response and rapid aid to the injured, and emergency situations 
are not the place for remediation of societal inequalities or meting out 
punishment and reward.163 As Gerald Winslow notes, “affirmative action in 
triage would generally seem strange and unwarranted. Few social injustices 
would be sufficient grounds for concluding that those who had reaped unfair 
benefits would thereby have lost their equal right to life.”164 
The second reason that corrective justice is usually foreign to triage 
practice is that claimants on a triaged resource are rarely responsible for the 
condition of shortage. Shortage is instead an exogenous condition caused by 
natural disaster, war, limited supplies, or even poor planning on the part of 
 
Promise?, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 191, 213–14 (Erkki J. Hollo, Kati Kulovesi, & Michael 
Mehling eds., 2013). 
 159  Posner and Weisbach object to corrective justice principles in climate change because of 
the “wrongdoer identity problem,” in which present generations are punished for emissions in 
the past. POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 22, at 103. They also contend that not all emissions in 
the past were morally culpable, particularly those emissions that predate the modern scientific 
consensus on global warming that emerged in the 1990s. Id. at 111.  
 160  See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1593. 
 161  See Farber, supra note 9, at 396. (“[T]o think of harmful CO2 emissions as only a 
historical phenomenon, unconnected with the lives of current-day Americans, is clearly 
mistaken.”).  
 162  Id. at 395–96.  
 163  See Pesik et al., supra note 122, at 644 (noting that “antisocial or aggressive behaviors” 
should not be considered in deciding aid priority within an emergency room setting).  
 164  WINSLOW, supra note 102, at 98. 
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triage personnel. Just deserts—punishing or rewarding claimants based on 
their contribution to the problem—thus rarely arises in triage. 
Climate change is a repeat triage situation, however, in which allocation 
decisions need to be made repeatedly over decades, opening a window for 
corrective justice claims that is normally closed in a typical triage situation. 
High-emitting nations such as the United States, China, Australia, and 
Canada, claiming rights to the future use of atmospheric space, are 
themselves responsible for the current condition of shortage, and their 
emissions are harming other nations.165 Climate change policy therefore 
should involve compensation by high-emitting countries for both past and 
ongoing injuries.  
This Article does not lay out the details of a compensation system, but 
it is important to note here that there are two distinct grounds for 
compensation. The first ground is the prior overuse of a shared resource, 
which does not depend on the occurrence of any physical injury to the party 
seeking compensation. The second ground is injury from emissions, which 
does not depend on any claim about overuse of a global commons. As 
Stephen Gardiner has observed, these two separate grounds are compatible 
with each other, and both serve as moral bases for compensation.166 
IV. FOUR IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE TRIAGE 
Recognizing the climate change crisis as a triage challenge helps to 
clarify the ethical stakes, but what does a triage framework mean in 
practice? This Part discusses four major implications of a climate change 
triage framework, elaborating on the theoretical discussions of Parts II and 
III to concretize how climate change triage might operate. It concludes by 
exploring the ways in which a triage framework might influence 
international law. 
A. Recognize Shortage Conditions 
The first major implication of a triage framework for climate change is 
that policy makers and treaty negotiators must recognize, and adhere to, 
conditions of shortage. The most tragic outcome in triage occurs when a 
resource in short supply is treated as if it were abundant. If life-saving drugs 
are severely limited after a mass trauma event, for instance, but medical 
personnel do not recognize the shortage, they will waste the precious 
resource in the near term, with long-term misery. 
The need to recognize shortage conditions should be apparent, yet 
policy makers are ignoring it. Governments are not setting national energy 
and environmental policy in a manner that reflects the true extent of scarcity 
in the atmosphere. They are instead treating the atmosphere as a naturally 
 
 165  See Stephen Gardiner, Ethics and Global Climate Change, 114 ETHICS 555, 579 (2004) 
(discussing the disproportionate amount of greenhouse gases emitted by developed countries).  
 166 Id. at 579–80.  
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abundant commodity such as aluminum, a substance we can continue to 
exploit. 
Recognizing shortage conditions would rule out some of the dominant 
approaches to climate mitigation today. Consider, for example, the “pledge 
and review” system for emissions reductions that many of the UNFCCC 
parties have embraced in the past five years.167 Such a system avoids legally 
binding, numeric emissions reductions targets in favor of voluntary policies 
and measures.168 The 2009 Copenhagen Accord was emblematic of this 
approach, and the United States continues to advocate such a system of 
“pledges” as the basis for a new international treaty or other agreement.169 
Indeed, a pledge and review system is probably the most likely outcome of 
the Paris climate negotiations in 2015.170 
There are two problems with this approach. First, looking only at 
developed countries, their pledges to date have been based on a percentage 
reduction from a baseline year, either 2005 or 1990, which locks in and 
grandfathers the highly unequal emissions patterns from those years.171 
Second, as soon as the ink was dry on the Copenhagen Accord, analysts 
concluded that the pledges made by all countries would not keep warming 
below two degrees––the stated objective of the Accord—but would instead 
lead to warming greater than two degrees, assuming, optimistically, that all 
these voluntary pledges were fully implemented.172 The mismatch between 
the pledges and the ultimate goal of the treaty was quickly dubbed the 
“emissions gap.”173 
 
 167  David Hunter, Implications of the Copenhagen Accord for Global Climate Governance, 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Winter 2010, at 4, 12–13. 
 168  See Kati Kulovesi, Exploring the Landscape of Climate Law and Scholarship: Two 
Emerging Trends, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 31, 46–47 (Erkki J. Hollo, Kati Kulovesi, & 
Michael Mehling eds., 2013); Daniel Bodansky, A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and 
Future U.N. Climate Change Regime, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 697, 705–06 (2011); Nathan Hultman, 
Brookings Inst., The Doha Climate Talks and Long Term Treaty Goals, http://www.brookings 
.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2012/11/21-doha-climate-talks-hultman (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) 
(explaining that UNFCCC parties informally agreed to the “pledge and review” system at 
Copenhagen in 2009 and officially endorsed the approach at the 2010 Cancun meeting). 
 169  See Valerie Volcovici, U.S. Envoy Sees New Plan Energizing Global Climate Talks, 
REUTERS, May 7, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/07/us-un-climate-us-plan-idUSBR 
E9460XY20130507 (last visited Nov. 22, 2014).  
 170  See Alister Doyle & Michael Szabo, U.N. Climate Talks Blocked Over Aid, Steps to 2015 
Deal, REUTERS, Nov. 23, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/11/23/uk-climate-talks-id 
UKBRE9AL0ZF20131123 (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (discussing text adopted by the Conference 
of the Parties in Warsaw that called on countries to make national pledges by early 2015 so that 
they can be compared and reviewed in time for the 2015 summit in Paris). But see Responding 
to Climate Change, Concrete Emissions Pledges ‘Not a Priority’ for 2015 Climate Deal—U.N. 
Official, http://www.rtcc.org/2013/09/18/concrete-emissions-pledges-not-a-priority-for-2015-clim 
ate-deal-un-official/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
 171  See, e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 133, at 37–38 (discussing the choice of the baseline 
year of 1990 under the Kyoto Protocol as an example of “gaming” the use of historic baselines in 
environmental law).   
 172  See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2012, at 1 
(2012).  
 173  See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT: TECHNICAL 
SUMMARY 10 (2010) (noting that even if the more ambitious policy options from the Copenhagen 
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By ignoring the physics of global warming and making national pledges 
that will quickly exhaust the carbon budget, parties may find it easier to 
reach agreement, but this approach evades the hard choices necessary to 
avoid exhausting the limited resource. As Calabresi and Bobbitt noted, tragic 
choices can always be made palatable by hiding the ball—that is, by not 
disclosing to the public the nature of the scarcity or the actual allocation 
formula being used. “Evasion, disguise, temporizing, deception are all ways 
by which artfully chosen allocation methods can avoid the appearance of 
failing to reconcile values in conflict.”174 But sound triage practice depends 
on the principle of honesty.175 Policy makers should adhere to the limits of 
the scarce resource and present the values in conflict for debate.176 
What would an alternative approach to climate mitigation look like? 
Viewing the climate crisis through the lens of triage would force policy 
makers to work backward from the realities of ecological scarcity. A triage 
lens would take the limited carbon budget seriously as a constraint on 
emissions—it would force us to recognize atmospheric finitude. National 
emissions pathways would then be negotiated in relationship to this red line, 
rather than the current approach of nations pledging to do what they can to 
reduce their own emissions, even if this leads to two degrees of warming or 
more.177 Within the carbon budget constraint of a triage framework, 
negotiators would bargain over issues such as emissions trading, targets and 
timetables, compensation, and adaptation assistance. The constraint of the 
limited capacity of the atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gases would be 
viewed as a firm one, however, not as a flexible target. 
B. Fulfill Responsibilities to Vulnerable Populations 
The second implication of climate change triage is that the largest 
greenhouse gas emitters need to fulfill their responsibilities toward 
vulnerable nations by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and providing 
significant funding to help vulnerable nations adapt to a warmer world. 
In traditional triage contexts, triage personnel serve as “trustee[s] for 
the social interest,”178 charged with the care and recovery of a vulnerable 
group. In most triage situations, patients themselves have lost their capacity 
for self-care and self-protection.179 The enormous power that triage 
personnel hold over vulnerable populations becomes ethically tolerable if 
two conditions are met: 1) the exigencies of wartime or disaster require 
 
Accord were implemented, the “emissions gap” would be approximately five billion tons of 
CO2). 
 174  CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 54, at 26.  
 175  See id. 
 176  See, e.g., id. at 18. 
 177  See infra text accompanying notes 172–173. 
 178  Rescher, supra note 115, at 178. 
 179  See Sharona Hoffman, Preparing for Disaster: Protecting the Most Vulnerable in 
Emergencies, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1491, 1499, 1546 (2009) (arguing that there are numerous 
vulnerable populations that have special needs that require “acute attention” during 
emergencies). 
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rapid decision making and a ceding of autonomy to triage personnel; and 2) 
the rapid decision making of triage is conducted impartially and fairly, 
according to some prioritization rule that is, ideally, debated and agreed to 
in advance.180 
Along with the power vested in triage personnel, in other words, comes 
a responsibility to allocate limited resources—such as physician time, drugs, 
painkillers, food, and shelter—fairly.181 It is crucial that triage decisions be 
made without bias or personal favoritism.182 Instead, they should be made 
from the perspective of what Adam Smith called the “fair and impartial 
spectator”—without a vested interest in the outcome.183 
In the context of climate change, it is unrealistic to expect nations to 
negotiate without regard to self-interest. But negotiating solely from self-
interest ignores the clear state of dependency that exists between the most 
vulnerable nations and the world’s largest emitters. The largest greenhouse 
gas emitters—the United States, the European Union, China, India, Japan, 
Canada, and Russia—are responsible for over 70% of global emissions 
annually.184 Other nations have little capacity for self-protection and are 
entirely dependent on the decisions of the largest emitters to mitigate the 
global growth of emissions. Developing countries in the mid-latitudes, for 
example, are predicted to experience the worst impacts from drought and 
desertification.185 Low-lying developing countries such as Bangladesh and 
island nations such as the Seychelles, the Bahamas, and the Marshall Islands 
 
 180  See Rescher, supra note 115, at 174–75 (explaining that triage decisions have 
traditionally been accepted on the battlefield and that a “reasonable code of operating 
principles” is necessary to guide triage decisions). 
 181  See id. at 173 (describing a physician’s dilemma in determining which patients will 
receive human resources and treatment).  
 182  See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 54, at 145; Rescher, supra note 115, at 176 
(“[Triage] must be fair—it must treat relevantly like cases alike, leaving no room for ‘influence’ 
or favoritism, etc.”). 
 183  ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 110 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie, eds., 
1976) (1759) (“We endeavor to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and 
impartial spectator would examine it.”). According to Smith, the justness of a particular social 
arrangement can be determined in reference to the views of a disinterested person who is not 
advocating any particular side. Such an impartial spectator need not be culturally similar to the 
parties dividing a resource. In fact, Smith argues, views of those a “certain distance from us” 
can help avoid the hold of ingrained culture and practice. Id. 
 184  See JOS G. J. OLIVER ET AL., TRENDS IN GLOBAL CO2 EMISSIONS: 2013 REPORT 8, 14 (2013), 
available at http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/trends-in-global-co2-emissions-2013-report. 
 185  See Zbigniew W. Kundzewicz et al., Freshwater Resources and Their Management, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING 
GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 175, 178, 187 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publica 
tions_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg2_report_impacts_adaptation_
and_vulnerability.htm; Neil Adger et al., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 8, 11, 16 (M.L. 
Parry et al. eds., 2007), available at  http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-
spm.pdf. 
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are likely to suffer severely from sea-level rise.186 Poor nations in general are 
more vulnerable to climate change because they have fewer resources to 
adapt to rising temperatures and are far more dependent on subsistence 
agriculture.187 
Under this relationship of power and dependence, the largest emitters 
have global responsibilities. They must reduce their emissions significantly, 
provide climate change adaptation assistance to poor countries, and 
consider the interests of vulnerable nations in setting their domestic energy 
and environmental policies.  
The largest emitters can fulfill these responsibilities at relatively modest 
cost. The IEA has estimated that nations must invest $1 trillion per year in 
renewable energy—about triple current rates—to maintain an 80% chance of 
keeping warming to below two degrees Celsius.188 This amount seems large 
at first glance. Because of operational savings over time, however, the IEA 
concluded that an investment program of this magnitude would have net 
positive returns by 2025 and total returns of $100 trillion to $150 trillion by 
2050.189 The developed world is not putting policies in place to incentivize 
that scale of investment. Indeed, the United States and Canada, as well as 
China and India, are locking in fossil fuel-based energy systems that will be 
in place for three decades or more.190 
To begin the enormous energy transition that needs to take place, 
governments will have to bridge the nationalist, short-term thinking that 
dominates the climate change discourse. Thinking about the problem 
through a triage framework helps to bring vulnerable countries and 
populations—and future generations—onto the radar screen of policy 
 
 186  See Mary-Elena Carr et al., Sea Level Rise in a Changing Climate: What Do We Know?, in 
THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF RISING SEAS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 40–
54 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory E. Wannier eds., 2013); Robert J. Nicholls et al., Coastal 
Systems and Low-Lying Areas, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND 
VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 185, at 326, 330–31. 
 187  As Rob Verchick has explained, even within a single nation, disaster vulnerability can 
vary widely. Vulnerability is a function not just of a community’s physical geography, but also of 
its social status, the competence of government institutions, and the location and strength of 
local infrastructure. See ROBERT R. M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION 
FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD 135–48 (2010); Robert R.M. Verchick, Disaster Justice: The 
Geography of Human Capability, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 23, 38–41 (2012).  
 188  INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES 2012, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1–2 
(2012), available at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/ETP2012SUM.pdf. 
 189  Id. at 1. These are undiscounted figures. The discounted return, at a quite high 10% 
discount rate, is $5 trillion in net savings between now and 2050. Id. 
 190  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2014), 
available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2014).pdf (noting that U.S. crude oil 
production surpassed the historic high reached in 1970); U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., CANADA 
(2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Canada/canada.pdf (forecasting 
rising Canadian oil production through 2040); U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., CHINA (2014), available 
at http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/China.pdf (forecasting a 50% increase in 
Chinese coal consumption by 2040); U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INDIA (2014), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/India/india.pdf (anticipating a doubling of Indian oil 
demand by 2040). 
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makers, ending the distancing that tends to marginalize small nations in the 
political discourse of larger ones. The triage lens also brings into focus the 
consequences of current emissions patterns: we are treating many nations of 
the world as expendable—as nations whose territories and populations can 
be sacrificed to promote the consumptive, fossil fuel-dependent lifestyles of 
the affluent. 
Prime Minister Tony de Brum of the Marshall Islands, which will likely 
be fully submerged this century by the rising seas, has argued forcefully in 
favor of protecting the vulnerable in climate change policy: 
The situation we face is as dire and serious as civil war, terrorism and nuclear 
weapons. The degree of imminence may differ, but they amount to the same 
thing. Which one of you here is willing to look me in the eye and tell me that the 
forced relocation of my people, the loss of my homeland and the disappearance 
of my country is not a matter which lies at the core of international peace and 
security? Is my country’s territorial integrity any less important than yours? 
Isn’t this place, the United Nations, built on the sovereign equality of states? . . . 
Treating the atmosphere like a Westphalian cake where we can haggle over the 
size of each country’s slice is wrong. Negotiating to get the best deal for our 
country over the interests of others is downright irresponsible.191 
Many realist international relations scholars would likely reject the core 
of Prime Minister de Brum’s argument, contending that a sovereign nation’s 
sole obligation is to maximize the welfare of its own citizens, and its sole 
responsibility in an international negotiation is to get the best deal for 
itself.192 Posner and Weisbach, for example, take the position that because 
reducing emissions is likely to be costly for the United States, it should not 
sign any climate change treaty unless the poor nations of the world pay the 
United States for its cooperation.193 
The “take care of our own” argument has little merit, however, when 
other nations, many in deep poverty, are directly harmed by emissions from 
the wealthiest nations. Responsibility toward vulnerable countries flows not 
from altruism or noblesse oblige, but rather from a duty of the high-emitting 
countries to mitigate their own transnational ecological externalities—a 
duty recognized in international law.194 For the United States, the relevant 
question is not whether climate change policy should primarily benefit 
Americans rather than non-nationals, but rather, what should the United 
States do to eliminate, or at least curtail, the transnational externalities of its 
 
 191  Tony de Brum, Prime Minister, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Speech Before the U.N. 
Security Council (Feb. 15, 2013), transcript available at http://www.independentdiplomat.org 
/debrumspeech. 
 192  See MICHAEL C. WILLIAMS, THE REALIST TRADITION AND THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 7 (2005); see also JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 3 (2006). 
 193  POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 22, at 86. 
 194  See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 
Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992), available at http://www.un.org/documents 
/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm. 
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own emissions?195 As Doug Kysar has explained, U.S. environmental law has 
frequently struggled with recognizing the needs of “others” that are not part 
of elite decision-making circles of U.S. lawyers and policy makers, including 
citizens of other countries and future generations.196 Kysar advocates a 
thicker conception of international responsibility, arguing that “law’s 
geography must become more expansive.”197 
C. Distribute Emissions Rights on an Egalitarian Basis 
The third implication of climate change triage is that a climate change 
agreement should allocate emissions rights on a roughly egalitarian basis in 
which a nation’s share of atmospheric space would correspond to its 
population size. Under such a per capita allocation, the 1,780 billion tons left 
in the global carbon “budget” could be hypothetically distributed among all 
people who are projected to live between now and 2050.198 The actual 
national allocations would then be calculated by multiplying this figure by 
population. Once allocated, nations would be free to sell or trade their 
emissions allocations to others. 
Within this egalitarian framework, there are a number of complicated 
design issues. For instance, population might initially be calculated at some 
base year, to avoid pro-natalist policies aimed at increasing population to 
receive greater emissions allocations.199 Determining precise population 
figures for many countries is difficult, and population accounting may need 
to be subject to verification. The per capita allocation could gradually be 
implemented over two to three decades to smooth the transition from highly 
unequal status quo. 
Although a per capita distribution would be a dramatic change from the 
status quo use of the atmosphere, some scholars contend that it does not go 
far enough, claiming that a per capita allocation is unjust because it 
tolerates, or grandfathers, the excess historic emissions of wealthy 
individuals and nations.200 Other scholars contend that equality may demand 
deviating from a strict per capita share, given different circumstances of 
different groups. Residents of very cold climates who need to burn fossil fuel 
for survival, for instance, may deserve a larger allocation of the resource.201 
 
 195  See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 130 (2011) (“We do not live in secluded cocoons 
of our own. And if the institutions and policies of one country influence lives elsewhere, should 
not the voices of affected people elsewhere count in some way in determining what is just or 
unjust in the way a society is organized . . . ?”).  
 196  KYSAR, supra note 76, at 123–24, 151. 
 197  Id. at 148. 
 198  See infra text accompanying note 209. 
 199  See Sinden, supra note 71, at 311–18 (discussing design considerations for per capita 
greenhouse gas allocation frameworks). 
 200  See, e.g., PAUL BAER ET AL., THE GREENHOUSE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS FRAMEWORK: THE 
RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN A CLIMATE CONSTRAINED WORLD 26–27, 104 n.6 (rev. 2d ed. 2008). 
 201  JAMES GARVEY, THE ETHICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: RIGHT AND WRONG IN A WARMING WORLD 
128 (2008) (stating that the average Norwegian might need more “emissions shares” than the 
average American because of Norway’s colder winters).  
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Henry Shue has argued that we should deviate from strict per capita 
allocations to prioritize the “subsistence” emissions of the poor over the 
“luxury” emissions of the already wealthy.202 Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein, 
on the other hand, argue that a per capita allocation goes too far. They argue 
that such an allocation amounts to a massive global redistribution of wealth 
and is unworkable in practice.203 Major emitting nations would never agree to 
it, they argue, and continuing to press this agenda threatens the prospects 
for a global treaty.204 
Although implementing egalitarian principles through a climate treaty 
would be complex and would likely involve some deviation from a strict per 
capita allocation, the per capita approach nonetheless serves as a kind of 
moral benchmark. Even if the ideal institutional arrangement cannot be 
reached, we need not reject arrangements short of the ideal. Instead, 
progress can be made by adoption of an agreement that moves in the 
direction of justice.205 Because the atmosphere is a common heritage of 
humanity, was previously treated as an undifferentiated commons, and now 
needs to be allocated somehow, the logical starting point for discussion 
should be an egalitarian distribution among all claimants.206 
Given the highly unequal distribution of emissions today, any allocation 
approaching a per capita distribution would be a step toward just 
arrangements compared to the status quo. The average American emits 
about 17.3 tons of carbon dioxide per year, several times more than citizens 
of some developing countries.207 The average Indian, for example, emits 
about 1.6 tons per year, and the average Mexican emits 3.9 tons per year.208 
Assuming a strict, global per capita allocation of the remaining carbon 
budget applied between now and 2050, each person would have a 
hypothetical individual allocation of approximately 155 tons of carbon 
dioxide.209 The average American would run through that allocation of 155 
 
 202  Gardiner, supra note 165, at 585 (discussing the merits of this approach). 
 203  See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1608 (noting that under a per capita allocation, 
the United States would have “less than 30% of the emissions rights” of India and China and 
arguing that such an allocation would represent a transfer of wealth “worth hundreds of billions 
of dollars”). 
 204  See id. See also POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 22, at 120 (arguing that it is “unlikely” 
that a per capita allocation system “will satisfy the demands of the United States”).  
 205  See SEN, supra note 195, at 9 (critiquing “transcendental” theories of justice and arguing 
that we should ask the question of “how would justice be advanced?” rather than the question 
“what would be perfectly just institutions?”). 
 206  See Sinden, supra note 71, at 319–20 (referring to the default assumption of distributing a 
common resource in equal shares). 
 207  OLIVER ET AL., supra note 184, at 29 tbl.A1.3 (reporting that U.S. per capita CO2 emissions 
are 2.4 times greater than China’s 7.2 tons, 10.8 times that of India’s 1.6 tons, and 7.5 times 
greater than Brazil’s 2.3 tons). 
 208  Id. 
 209  Assuming 1,780 billion tons left in the carbon budget through 2050, and approximately 11 
billion–12 billion people who will live between now and 2050, the carbon budget on a per capita 
basis is approximately 155 tons per person. The UN Population Division estimates there will be 
9.5 billion people alive in 2050, and there are approximately 2 billion additional people alive 
now, older than age 45, who will likely die before 2050. See US Census Bureau, World 
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tons in about nine years.210 For the United States, sustainable use of a strict 
per capita allocation of the carbon budget would require, over the next few 
decades, 80%–90% reductions in per capita emissions from 2005 levels.211 
A reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of that scale may seem 
politically untenable in the United States, but in the not-so-distant past, this 
scale of reductions was very much on the U.S. political agenda. During the 
2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama and John McCain both called for 
80% reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.212 In 2009, the House of 
Representatives passed the Waxman–Markey climate change bill, which 
provided for 80% emissions reductions below 2005 levels by 2050.213 The 
United Kingdom has enacted legislation that requires 80% emissions 
reductions below 1990 levels by 2050, starting from an earlier baseline than 
the United States.214 Moreover, the European Union’s per capita emissions 
are about half those of the United States, suggesting that substantial 
emissions reductions are feasible while maintaining a high standard of 
living.215 
D. Conduct Long-Term Planning for Economic Transition 
The fourth major implication of a triage framework for climate change 
is that nations must conduct long-term planning for the transition to low-
carbon economies. This differs from the first principle of climate change 
triage—recognize shortage conditions—because the planning discussed here 
 
Population by Age and Sex, http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/world 
pop.php (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
 210  See id. 
 211  A gradual reduction in per capita emissions in the United States along a trajectory aiming 
at 90% reductions from the status quo of 17.3 tons of carbon dioxide per American would 
eventually bring these emissions to approximately 1.7 tons per year, a more sustainable 
emissions rate through 2050 assuming a 155-ton individual carbon budget. Reductions could 
occur more slowly if the United States purchased emissions rights from other countries. For a 
similar calculation of an individual carbon budget through 2050, based on IEA and UN figures, 
see Shrink That Footprint, Carbon Targets for Your Footprint, http://shrinkthat 
footprint.com/carbon-targets-for-your-footprint (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (estimating an 
individual’s sustainable carbon footprint at 2.1 tons of carbon dioxide in 2050, using a per capita 
allocation and estimates of global population in that year). 
 212  John M. Broder, Obama Affirms Climate Change Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/us/politics/19climate.html?_r=1& (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
 213  See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 702 (1st 
Sess. 2009). In a November 2011 poll, the Yale Project on Climate Change Communication found 
that 66% of Americans would support an international treaty that requires the United States to 
make 90% cuts in emissions of carbon dioxide by 2050. See YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
COMM., CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY 
POLICIES IN NOVEMBER 2011, at 6 (2011) available at http://www.climatechangecommuni 
cation.org/images/files/PolicySupportNovember2011.pdf.  
 214  See Climate Change Act, 2008, c. 27, § 1 (U.K.). 
 215  See generally The World Bank, Data: CO2 Emissions (metric tons per capita), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries/US—EU?display=graph (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2014) (indicating that U.S. per capita CO2 emissions are approximately twice 
that of the European Union). 
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is about long-term climate governance, rather than the immediate problem 
of allocating emissions rights under a climate change treaty. 
One of the major lessons of traditional triage practice is that triage 
personnel should not only respond to immediate scarcities, but should also 
plan to avoid future scarcity. For example, medical personnel may perform 
admirably in allocating aid after a hurricane, but their work is only partial if 
they neglect to do long-term planning to ensure that a sufficient amount of 
aid is stockpiled for the next emergency. As many triage experts have noted, 
long-term triage planning should involve community input and consultation 
with stakeholders.216 Communities should determine, for example, how 
much to spend on preparedness, stockpiling, and emergency response 
versus other community needs. Planning should involve consultation with 
vulnerable populations,217 as well as stakeholder input on the ethical basis 
for rationing or allocation, so that the public is not first confronted with 
these hard choices under disaster conditions.218 
Triage conditions do not emerge out of nowhere. In many triage 
situations, the conditions of scarcity reflect prior societal decisions on how 
to value and allocate resources. As Calabresi and Bobbitt observed, “scarcity 
is not the result of any absolute lack of a resource but rather of the decision 
by society that it is not prepared to forgo other goods and benefits in a 
number sufficient to remove the scarcity.”219 In other triage situations, 
however, the conditions of scarcity may simply reflect mismanagement, 
ineptitude, and poor planning, as in the governmental response to Hurricane 
Katrina.220 By instituting a credible planning process that involves multiple 
stakeholders, governments and emergency personnel can avoid blundering 
into these conditions of scarcity. 
There has been some advance planning on how to adapt to a warmer 
world, as governments begin to focus on issues such as hardening of 
 
 216  Hoffman, supra note 179, at 1541–42 (advocating predisaster consultation with 
vulnerable groups including the disabled and the elderly).  
 217  Id. at 1541.  
 218  Sztajnkrycer et al., supra note 109, at 763 (“The time to address or resolve these complex 
issues is not during or after a disaster, but rather in the preparatory phase. The discussion must 
be transparent and reflect the cultural, ethical, and moral makeup of the community as a 
whole.”). See also Hoffman, supra note 179, at 1508 (“Planning before catastrophic events have 
struck will diminish the need for government agencies to make difficult moral choices in the 
midst of emergencies.”). 
 219  See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 54, at 22.  
 220  Frank Braio, Understanding Triage: Three Sorts and Cases, in PERSPECTIVES ON DEATH 
AND DYING 18 (Philip A. Pecorino ed., 2002), available at http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/pecorip 
/scccweb/etexts/deathanddying_text/Understanding%20Triage.pdf (stating that in the “technical, 
economic, and political decisions of one’s community” lay “the socially and historically 
determined seeds . . . of triage situations.” Braio notes that such a deep inquiry into triage 
necessarily involves studying “one’s community’s attentiveness and/or blindness, intelligence 
and/or stupidity, rationality and/or irrationality, responsibility and/or irresponsibility.”); see also 
Eli Kintisch, Levees Came Up Short, Researchers Tell Congress, SCI., Nov. 11, 2005, at 953 
(explaining how the levees protecting New Orleans gave way due to human error and poor 
planning).  
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infrastructure and planning for water shortages.221 But given the closing of 
the two degree window and the rapid energy and economic transition that 
needs to take place by 2050, the planning for climate change mitigation has 
not been adequate for the task ahead. In the United States, Congress and 
business leaders still have not confronted the scale of the challenge. 
Because of sophisticated campaigns of climate change denial and a host of 
psychological factors that lead people to discount long-term risk, millions of 
Americans have been lulled into a false sense that climate change is not 
caused by humans and that the coming changes will be benign.222 As a result, 
the American public is unprepared to take the needed steps on a national 
level.223 The public is also unaccustomed to the degree of international 
governmental coordination that will be needed to keep warming within two 
degrees Celsius. 
The triage challenge for policy makers in the United States and other 
nations, therefore, is not just to allocate a limited carbon budget, but also to 
open far-reaching conversations about changing energy systems, land use, 
and transportation—conversations about how we should be living and what 
constitutes a decent life. Governments need to begin to prepare their 
citizens for the difficult choices ahead, including not only changes in 
technology, but also changes in lifestyle and behavior. Different values in 
international relations will be needed to sustain us through the climate 
change crisis—values like reciprocity, obligation, solidarity, and resilience. 
As Jed Purdy observes, our long-term response to climate change may 
involve “changing our ethical vocabulary” entirely.224 
In climate change law, a triage framework offers a better organizing 
framework for this long-term planning than the principle of sustainable 
 
 221  See, e.g., MARK HERTSGAARD, HOT: LIVING THROUGH THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS ON EARTH 60–
62 (2011) (describing adaptation efforts undertaken by the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
and United States municipalities); Alan Feuer, After Hurricane Sandy, New York Rebuilds for 
the Future, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/26/nyregion/after-hurri 
cane-sandy-new-york-rebuilds-for-the-future.html?_r=0 (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (describing 
New York City’s efforts to protect critical infrastructure from rising seas and storm surge).  
 222  See Anthony Leiserowitz, Communicating the Risks of Global Warming: American Risk 
Perceptions, Affective Images, and Interpretive Communities, in CREATING A CLIMATE FOR 
CHANGE: COMMUNICATING CLIMATE CHANGE AND FACILITATING SOCIAL CHANGE 44, 47–53 (S. Moser 
& L. Dilling eds., 2007) (discussing climate change and risk perception, affective imagery, and 
interpretive communities); Stephan Lewandowsky et al., NASA Faked the Moon Landing––
Therefore, (Climate) Science is a Hoax: An Anatomy of the Motivated Rejection of Science, 24 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 622, 622 (2013) (discussing the “manufacture of doubt” by climate change 
skeptics); Anita Pugliese & Julie Ray, Fewer Americans, Europeans View Global Warming as a 
Threat, GALLUP, Apr. 20, 2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/147203/fewer-americans-europeans-
view-global-warming-threat.aspx (last visited Nov. 22, 2014); see also AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, 
PSYCHOLOGY & GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: ADDRESSING A MULTIFACETED PHENOMENON AND SET OF 
CHALLENGES 6 (2010) (analyzing the psychology of climate change); CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON 
ENVTL. DECISIONS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION: A GUIDE FOR 
SCIENTISTS, JOURNALISTS, EDUCATORS, POLITICAL AIDES, AND THE INTERESTED PUBLIC 1 (2009) 
(noting that Americans are not very concerned about climate change). 
 223 See generally Laurence L. Delina & Mark Diesendorf, Is Wartime Mobilisation a Suitable 
Policy Model for Rapid National Climate Mitigation?, 58 ENERGY POL’Y 371, 371 (2013).  
 224  Purdy, supra note 153, at 918. 
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development, the reigning paradigm to date for balancing development and 
environmental goals. 
Sustainable development is a notoriously broad and undefined concept 
and it has been described and interpreted in innumerable ways.225 The core 
idea is that economic development needs to be harmonized with, and should 
not undermine, environmental and social goals.226 Because sustainable 
development is such a vague concept, however, its meaning has become 
malleable, like shifting sands.227 Indeed, many politicians and business 
leaders have interpreted sustainable development to mean that rapid 
economic growth should be prioritized, on the grounds that richer countries 
will ultimately invest more in environmental protection.228 There is little 
consensus on the goal that sustainable development aspires to, the 
resources that need be conserved to achieve sustainable development, and 
the particular policy changes that are needed to achieve sustainable 
development. As a practical matter, thirty years of international negotiations 
and national policymaking under the rubric of sustainable development have 
not slowed the rise in greenhouse gas emissions. By any measure, global 
development since the 1990s has not been sustainable.229 
With its focus on harmonization of goals, the sustainable development 
paradigm has lulled people into a false optimism that economic growth and 
ecological preservation can reinforce each other, and do so indefinitely. A 
more honest evaluation of our situation would recognize that there needs to 
be some agreement—negotiated through a political process—on what steps 
need to be taken to preserve specific scarce and irreplaceable resources. In 
other words, there needs to be a triage planning process. 
Climate change triage, far more than the broad concept of sustainable 
development, focuses attention on specific ecological resources that need to 
be preserved. Because triage is premised on conserving and allocating 
scarce resources, it highlights, in a way that sustainable development does 
not, that there are limits to the growth in the scale of human activities. The 
science is clear that we need to achieve certain numeric targets for annual 
global emissions and for atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, 
and a triage framework uses that science as its underlying metric for 
 
 225  See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 172 (4th ed. 
2011). 
 226  See Robin Kundis Craig & Melinda Harm Benson, Replacing Sustainability, 46 AKRON L. 
REV. 841, 846 (2013) (stating that, in theory, “sustainability leads to laws and policies that limit 
human activity in and consumption of the natural environment to levels that can be continued 
on a long-term basis”). 
 227  See Melissa Powers, Making Sustainability Count, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,345, 10,345 (2013) 
(“[T]he term sustainability has become so ubiquitous and amorphous that it seems to have no 
common meaning.”).  
 228  The meaning of sustainable development has shifted in the last three decades, from an 
emphasis on environmental protection to an emphasis on economic growth. Donald K. Anton, 
The “Thirty-Percent Solution” and the Future of International Environmental Law, 10 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 209, 217 (2012) (tracing the history of meanings and interpretations of 
sustainable development).  
 229  See id. at 217. 
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planning. Sustainable development, in contrast, lacks any yardstick for 
measuring success. 
By failing to specify its ecological aims or the process that needs to be 
implemented to avert catastrophic warming, sustainable development has 
become increasingly irrelevant as an organizing concept for the international 
law of climate change. A successor paradigm is needed. Viewing the climate 
crisis through the lens of triage provides an alternative framework that 
highlights, rather than obscures, the political, technological, and ethical 
choices we face. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Climate change has long been recognized as a problem of pollution of 
the global commons. But the features of the problem that resemble triage, 
such as a quantified and limited carbon budget, complicated zero-sum 
allocation dilemmas, and increasingly severe climate change impacts, have 
come into view more recently. As this Article has shown, the ethical 
principles that have governed traditional triage contexts help to illuminate 
how to structure a fair and effective global climate change regime. While the 
triage lens cannot dictate every aspect of a climate change treaty, it both 
highlights the core allocation dilemma at the heart of treaty negotiations and 
points the way toward just solutions. 
Triage, to be sure, can be interpreted as pessimistic and defeatist. We 
often use the word triage when something has gone horribly wrong. People 
use the word in casual conversation when they feel overwhelmed with 
competing priorities. In the context of climate change, triage reflects the 
reality we face. A triage framework for climate change mitigation is not an 
abandonment of justice. It instead provides an organizing framework for 
finding just solutions within the new reality of scarcity and constraint. 
 
